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An Appraisal of the Louisiana Law of
Partnership
A COMPARATIVE LAW FOCUS ON SOURCE MATERIALS
AND UNDERLYING PRACTICES*
(PART I)
F. HODGE O'NEALt
PREFACE
This article examines the Louisiana law of partnership, a
branch of the state's law which is thought on the whole to have
remained "civilian," with the aim to determine (1) whether this
branch of Louisiana law, purely verbal differences being disre-
garded, is materially different from the corresponding segment of
Anglo-American law; and (2) whether the Louisiana law of
partnership, in those respects in which it does differ, is superior
or inferior to the law of other states.
The discussion of these two questions is subdivided into four
sections. The first section traces historically the development of
the Louisiana law of partnership and, by analyzing the authorities
cited by counsel and by the courts, attempts to arrive at the re-
spective influences of civil and common law on that development
and to determine the extent to which Louisiana courts have taken
rules of partnership law directly from Anglo-American sources.
In the subsequent sections of this article three basic phases of
partnership law are selected for detailed examination; those three
phases include most of the fundamental partnership doctrines.
The second section compares the scope of the partnership concept
in Louisiana with that in Anglo-American jurisdictions, examines
the respective tests which have been used to determine when a
partnership exists, and attempts to determine whether the facts
essential to create a partnership in Louisiana are the same as the
factual requisites in Anglo-American jurisdictions. The third
section investigates the juridical nature of the Louisiana partner-
* The substance of this article was submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for an advanced degree in law at Yale Law School.
t Dean, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
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ship and attempts to determine whether the entity view, which
the Louisiana courts have adopted from the French commentators,
has resulted in underlying practices basically different from those
prevailing in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Finally, the fourth
part scrutinizes the various kinds of partnerships discussed in the
Louisiana Civil Code and in the Louisiana jurisprudence and com-
pares them with conceptual and functional equivalents in Anglo-
American law to determine whether the Louisiana devices also
prevail in Anglo-American jurisdictions, and whether the Louisi-
ana classifications and the varying rules applied to each class
serve any useful purpose. Throughout this article an effort is
made to cut through terminology and to view the law as it actu-
ally functions.
A comparative treatment of the Louisiana law of partnership
is difficult. Approximately one thousand Louisiana decisions have
considered questions of partnership law; these cases extend from
1815 to the present time. No jurisprudence could be more confus-
ing or more irreconcilable. The development of consistent juris-
prudence has been hindered rather than assisted by the partner-
ship articles of the Civil Code.' In the first place, many of these
codal provisions are vague and confusing; in particular the defini-
tions of the various kinds of partnerships are imprecise and con-
tradictory. In the second place, the codal provisions were drafted
in 1825 in substantially their present form and were intended to
apply to ordinary partnerships (roughly equivalent to the non-
commercial partnerships of Anglo-American law); clearly these
provisions are not now, and long have not been, adequate to
regulate business practices in the rapidly changing American
economy. Louisiana courts and Louisiana lawyers, faced with
these deficiencies in their statutory law, at various times have ex-
amined rules and reasoning from a variety of sources-some
Spanish, some French, and some Anglo-American.
Though the results attained by the courts in particular de-
cisions involving partnership law usually have been equitable,
the courts have not reconciled the reasoning on which their de-
cisions are based or laid down a consistent system of rules for
the future guidance of the legal profession. In many instances,
1. Arts. 2801-2890, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Other than the provisions
of the Civil Code, apparently the only Louisiana statutes directly relating to
partnerships are La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 2668-2669 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§
6495-64961; La. Act 248 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6497-6502]. See Louisi-
ana State Law Institute, Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code (1942)
504-506.
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counsel have argued, and the courts have decided, questions of
partnership law as if they were of first impression when in reality
the identical points had been adjudicated in prior decisions.
Further, many of the cases dealing with partnership law were
decided between 1825 and 1860. To evaluate these early cases is
extremely difficult in view of the great political, social, and eco-
nomic changes which have occurred in Louisiana since the Civil
War. Legal writers have rendered but little assistance in clarify-
ing Louisiana's partnership law. Extra-judicial materials dis-
cussing Louisiana partnership law are brief and deal with prob-
lems narrow in scope. In all, probably less than fifteen pages of
text material relating to the Louisiana partnership have been
written. 2 Each year the disorder in this field of Louisiana law has
become more bewildering.
SECTION I. INFILTRATION: A CHRONICLE OF STRIFE
BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS
The Louisiana law of partnership, perhaps even more than
other phases of Louisiana law, is a legacy of a legal "melting pot."
From La Salle's exploration of the Mississippi River until 1769
Louisiana was governed by the laws of France. In that year,
seven years after the cession to Spain, French laws and legal
institutions were abolished and those of Spain established. French
rule returned. in 1800, but the French did not retain possession
long enough to re-establish French legal institutions.' In 1804,
the year after Louisiana was transferred to the United States, the
Superior Court of Louisiana (organized under congressional au-
thority) 2 held that the laws in force were the Spanish laws which
had been introduced into the province in 1769 by its Captain
General, Don Alexander O'Reilly.3
When Louisiana was ceded to the United States, pioneers
from the United States-strong men eager to maintain the con-
2. These writings are: Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisi-
ana (edited by Bonomo, 1925) 497-498; McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisiana
(1936) 10 Tulane L. Rev. 489, 504-505, 532; The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1937-38 Term (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 314, 350-
351; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-39 Term (1939)
2 LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW 31, 62-63; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1942-1943 Term (1944) 5 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 512, 526; The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term (1947) 7
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 259-260; Note (1946) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 307.
1. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law (1934) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 396.
2. La. Act of March 26, 1804, c. 38, 2 Stat. 283 (1850).
3. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, Foreword, A Republication of the Projet
of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825 (1937) v.
1949]
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tinuity of their culture-began to migrate into Louisiana. Among
the pioneers who flocked into the new American territory were
American lawyers trained in the common law of England and
armed with the books of Blackstone, the Constitution of the
United States, and shortly afterward the works of Kent and
Story.4
The impatient, forceful pioneer lawyers encountered a "for-
eign" legal system, composed of a confusing and contradictory
mass of authoritative materials, most of which were unobtainable
and practically all of which were written in Spanish or French.
The American lawyers were bewildered and frustrated. Soon
after Louisiana became a territory of the United States, they
attempted to install the common law of England as the basic
legal pattern of the new territory.5 The attempt was largely
unsuccessful.
The Creole population of the state, particularly members of
the bar in the influential City of New Orleans, vigorously op-
posed the introduction of Anglo-American law. L. Moreau-Lislet
and Pierre Derbigny, both of whom had been educated in France,
were among the most active in the fight against the importation
of common law. Due to the efforts of those who wished to retain
the civil law, a provision was incorporated in the Louisiana Con-
stitution of 1812 which prohibited the legislature from adopting
any system or code of laws by general reference;6 and further to
insure the retention of the civil law, jurisconsults were ap-
pointed by the Legislative Council and the House of Represen-
tatives of the Territory of Orleans to draft a civil code based on
the laws then in effect in the territory.7
The jurisconsults appointed did not base their code on the
4. "The Louisiana Purchase . . . brought the territory of Orleans and the
commercially important City of New Orleans under the sovereignty of the
United States, resulting in a great influx of 'Yankee' entrepreneurs, not few
or unimportant among whom were lawyers and business men seeking their
fortunes." Morrison, The Need for a Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code
(1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 213, 225.
5. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, loc. cit. supra note 3. See also Tucker,
Source Books of Louisiana Law (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 280, 280-281.
6. La. Const. (1812) Art. IV, § 11: "The existing laws in this Territory,
when this Constitution goes into effect, shall continue in force until altered
or abolished by the Legislature; Provided, however, That the Legislature
shall never adopt any system or code of laws by a general reference to the
said system or code, but in all cases shall specify the several provisions of
the laws it may enact." Very similar provisions have been incorporated into
subsequent Louisiana constitutions. La. Const. (1845) Art. 120; La. Const.
(1852) Art. 117; La. Const. (1864) Art. 120; La. Const. (1868) Art. 116; La.
Const. (1879) Art. 31; La. Const. (1898) Art. 33; La. Const. (1913) Art. 33; La.
Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 18.
7. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, op. cit. supra note 3, at vi.
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Spanish law then in force in Louisiana but instead took as a
model the civil law of France. They drafted the code in French;
but prior to its consideration by the general assembly, transla-
tors also prepared an English version. In 1808 the general assem-
bly adopted the new code." On the sources of the Code of 1808,
Benjamin Wall Dart commented: 9
"This Code preserved for us the fundamentals of the Civil
Law. It is commonly said that it is a copy of a projet of the
Code Napoleon. This is technically correct but the Digest also
embodied changes and modifications to suit the condition of
the time and the people, including principles of French and
Spanish law made familiar in Louisiana during the Colonial
regime." 10
But the adoption of the Code of 1808 did not determine con-
clusively which system of law was to prevail in Louisiana. The
fact that the Code of 1808 was modeled on a projet of the Code
Napoleon of course led to the examination of French authorities.
Yet, the Code of 1808, as mentioned by Benjamin Wall Dart, also
contained principles of Spanish law; and Cottin v. Cottin," de-
cided in 1817, encouraged a resort to Spanish authorities by de-
claring that the Code of 1808 had only abrogated those parts of
the Spanish law in force at the time of its adoption which were
expressly repealed by the code or which were incompatible with
its provisions.
A way also was open for the consideration of Anglo-American
authorities, at least with respect to problems involving commer-
cial partnerships. Article 61, page 400, of the Code of 1808 stipu-
lated that the provisions of the title of the code devoted to part-
nerships applied to commercial partnerships, "in as much only
as they do not contain any thing contrary to the laws and usages
of commerce. '12 The Louisiana Supreme Court finally declared
8. Tucker, supra note 5, at 282.
9. Dart, Introduction, Civil Code of the State of Louisiana, Revision of
1870 (ed. and ann. 1932) iv.
10. For a number of opinions as to the source of the Code of 1808, see
Tucker, supra note 5, at 283-284.
11. 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (La. 1817). "It must not be lost sight of, that our
civil code is a digest of the civil laws, which were in force in this country,
when it was adopted; that those laws must be considered as untouched,
wherever the alterations and amendments, introduced in the digest, do not
reach them; and that such parts of those laws only are repealed, as are
either contrary to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code." Id. at 94.
12. French text (which under the Code of 1808 controlled in case of
conflict with the English translation): "Les dispositions du prdsent titre ne
s'appliquent au.x socidtds de commerce, que dans les points qui n'ont rien de
contraire aux lois et usages du commerce."
1949]
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that the phrase "laws and usages of commerce" in that article
meant the laws and usages prevailing in other states of the union,
unless such laws and usages conflicted with the positive legisla-
lation of Spain or were in derogation of locally prevailing Louisi-
ana usages.13
The clash in Louisiana, after the Code of 1808 was adopted,
between the French, Spanish, and Anglo-American systems of
law is revealed vividly by an examination of the authorities cited
by counsel and the courts in partnership cases. In the first Louisi-
ana case involving a partnership problem, Kemper v. Smith,14
decided in 1815, the court cited one French authority and one
Spanish authority. Counsel in the case-one of whom was Ed-
ward Livingston, a native of New York, who had had considerable
practice in the common law before coming to Louisiana' 5-cited
in their briefs four French authorities, one Spanish, and seven'
Anglo-American.' 6 In a rehearing of the same case the following
year,' 7 counsel referred the court to fifteen French works, three
works on Spanish law, two Roman authorities, five Anglo-Ameri-
can authorities, one Louisiana decision, and three articles of the
Louisiana Code. The French authorities cited by counsel on the
two hearings of the case were predominantly the works of
Pothier. The Spanish work most heavily relied on was the
C6digo de las Siete Partidas,5 usually referred to and cited in
Louisiana as the "Partidas." The Anglo-American authorities
cited were Blackstone, Anglo-American treatises on contracts and
equity, and partnership cases from other American states. Ap-
parently no partnership treatise written in English was available
at that time.
The reports of cases involving questions of partnership law
decided subsequent to Kemper v. Smith but prior to the drafting
of the Civil Code of 1825 reveal little concerning the respective
influences of Spanish, French, and Anglo-American authorities
on the decisions of the courts. The court considered partnership
questions in seventeen of the cases reported for that period. Char-
acteristic of the early Louisiana decisions, little authority was
13. McDonald v. Millaudon, 5 La. 403, 408 (1833).
14. 3 Mart. (O.S.) 622 (La. 1815).
15. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, op. cit. supra note 3, at vii.
16. In counting the number 'of authorities in briefs of counsel and in
opinions of the courts, each reference to an authority is considered as a
separate citation as long as the reference occurs in a different part of a brief
or opinion. Reference at a single point in a brief or opinion to different
sections of the same authority is counted as one citation.
17. Smith v. Kemper, 4 Mart.(O.S.) 409 (La. 1816).
18. Code of Seven Parts.
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cited. 19 In eight of these cases no authority at all was cited; in
the other nine opinions the citation totals were: five French,
three Spanish, two Anglo-American, six prior Louisiana deci-
sions, and five articles of the Louisiana Code.
Unfortunately, briefs of counsel in these partnership cases
are not reported. An examination of the names of counsel listed
as arguing the cases indicate that a majority were of Irish, Scotch,
or English extraction. Probably most of them did not possess
French and Spanish law books 20 and could not have read such
materials had they been available. Anglo-American cases and
texts likely were cited to the courts in considerable number but
did not find their way into judicial opinions. The failure of the
Louisiana Supreme Court to cite more Anglo-American authori-
ties may be attributable in part to the domination of the court
during this period by Francois-Xavier Martin, a staunch propo-
nent of the civil law of France.
The confusion resulting from the virtual revival of Spanish
law by Cottin v. Cottin21 induced the general assembly on March
14, 1822, to appoint L. Moreau-Lislet, Edward Livingston, and
Pierre Derbigny to revamp the Code of 1808. These men did not
confine themselves to the legislative mandate; instead they
drafted an entirely new code. The result of their efforts, the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, was based in part on a projet of the
Code Napoleon 22 and in part on the writings of the French legal
scholars Pothier, Domat, and Toullier. 23 Like the Code of 1808,
the Code of 1825 originally was prepared in French. Even today,
the French text of those articles of the Code of 1825, which have
been carried over into the present Louisiana Civil Code, will
prevail in case of conflict over the English translations now in-
corporated in the Civil Code.24
19. Perhaps the early failure of the court to cite authority indicates that
it was not at that time influenced by the Anglo-American notion of stare
decisis.
20. The scarcity of foreign legal materials is noted in Preface, 1 Mart.
(O.S.) iii.
21. 5 Mart.(O.S.) 93 (La. 1817), discussed supra p. 311.
22. "As the French Civil Code was then at the height of its influence with
two decades of experience as proof of its claim to perfection as a profes-
sional instrument it was but natural that a traditionless, quasi-civilian bar,
faced with a strange and disorganized mass of foreign source material,
should turn to the Code CiviZ for inspiration regardless of legislative instruc-
tions." Morrison, supra note 4, at 227.
In certain instances the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 followed recom-
mendations appearing in a projet of the Code Napoleon. 3 Louisiana Legal
Archives, Foreword, Compiled Edition of the Civil. Codes of Louisiana (1940)
xiii.
23. Tucker, supra note 5, at 289.
24. Egerton v. The Third Municipality of New Orleans, I La. Ann. 435, 437
1949]
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The adoption of the Code of 1825 did not by any means elimi-
nate the influence of other legal systems on the development of
the Louisiana law of partnership, nor did it prevent counsel from
citing or the courts from considering Spanish, French, and Anglo-
American authorities. The period between 1825 and 1860 was one
of much partnership litigation. The partnership during those
years was the predominant business device for the conduct of
both large and small commercial enterprises. At least as many
partnership cases were decided in Louisiana during those thirty-
five years as during any other equal period of time. Many of the
cases established "new" law. The broad, general provisions of
the code 25 clearly were not adequate to govern the fast-growing
businesses and rapidly-changing commercial practices of an
American state. Louisiana courts and Louisiana lawyers, encum-
bered by codal provisions inadequate to meet the growing com-
plexities of commercial life, were faced with the necessity of
developing supplementary legal principles or of borrowing them
from other jurisdictions. The natural course of action for busy
courts and lawyers was to resort to other legal systems.
The hoary Roman law of course could not contribute to
the solution of the problems which confronted the Louisiana
courts; consequently Roman works were not cited to any appre-
ciable extent by either counsel or court. Counsel cited Roman
authorities only six times between 1825 and 1862 and the court
cited such works only eight times. Even in these few instances,
apparently no real reliance was placed on those authorities; they
were used as indicia of scholarship to embellish the briefs and
opinions. Soon after the adoption of the Code of 1825, Spanish
principles and authorities also ceased to play any considerable
part in the development of the Louisiana law of partnership. In
the ten years immediately following the enactment of the Code
of 1825, Spanish authorities in a few instances were utilized by
the courts; but, in those instances, the legal relations involved
(though not litigated until after the adoption of the Code of 1825)
arose while the Code of 1808 was still in effect.
In Morgan v. His Creditors,2 6 decided in 1830, the question
was whether a separate creditor was entitled to a preference with
respect to the separate assets of his debtor over the claims of
(1846); Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547,551 (1886); Straus v. City of New
Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1048, 118 So. 125, 130 (1928); Sample v. Whitaker, 172
La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
25. Arts. 2772-2861, La. Civil Code of 1825.
26. 8 Mart. (N.S.) 599 (La. 1830).
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creditors of a firm in which the debtor was a member. The sepa-
rate creditor had two claims, one created in 1824 prior to the
effective date of the Code of 1825 and the other created in 1825
subsequent to the effective date of the code. The court, relying
primarily on Spanish authorities, held that under the Code of
1808 the creditor was entitled to a priority with respect to the
claim created in 1824; but that he was not entitled to a preference
on the claim created in 1825, the Code of 1825 having changed
the pre-existing law. The court determined that under the Code
of 1825 partnership creditors had a preference on partnership as-
sets but individual creditors did not have a preference on indi-
vidual assets-a unique rule which prevails even today in Lou-
isiana,27 though it is contrary to Roman, Spanish, French, and
Anglo-American laws.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in 1830, in Louisiana Bank
v. Kenner's Succession,28 also made extensive use of Spanish legal
materials in holding that a stipulation in the articles of partner-
ship was inoperative which bound the heirs of a deceased partner
to continue the partnership and to assume responsibility for
contracts made in the partnership name. Counsel also cited
Spanish authorities to the court in 1831, in Bauduc's Syndic v.
Laurent,29 and again in 1834, in Flower v. Millaudon,30 but appar-
ently the action of the court was not affected by those authori-
ties. 3' Never again were Spanish legal materials to have any
appreciable influence on the development of the Louisiana law
of partnership. Only one Spanish authority was cited by the
court from 1840 to 1862 in partnership cases, and not a single
Spanish authority was cited in the briefs of counsel reported for
that period.
The decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court and the re-
ported briefs of counsel, for the period 1825 through 1862, con-
tain ninety-eight citations to French legal materials on partner-
ship. A greater resort to French authorities might have been
expected in view of the close similarity between many partner-
ship articles of the Louisiana Code of 1825 and corresponding
27. Town v. The Syndics of Morgan, Dorsey & Co., 2 La. 112 (1830); Ber-
nard v. Dufour, 17 La. 596 (1841) (decision suspended by application for
rehearing and never became final); Flower v. Their Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 189
(1848). Cf. Hagan v. Scott, 10 La. 345, 349 (1836).
28. 1 La. 384 (1830).
29. 2 La. 449, 452 (1831).
30. 6 La. 697, 704 (1834).
31. The Spanish authorities cited by counsel in Bauduc's Syndics v.
Laurent were listed in the opinion of the court. 2 La. 449, 452 (1831). The
briefs were not reported separately.
1949)
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articles in the Code Napoleon. Perhaps the principal reasons that
French legal materials were not used more often were facts al-
ready mentioned, the inaccessibility of such materials and the
inability of most members of the legal profession to use the
French language.
Pothier, whose works were highly regarded in both France
and Louisiana, was cited in the Louisiana partnership cases of
this period far more frequently than other French authorities.
One reason for the popularity of Pothier in Louisiana may have
been that some of his works were available in English: Francois-
Xavier Martin early translated into English and published Pothier
on Obligations;82 and toward the end of the period Owen Davis
Tudor, an Englishman, translated Pothier on Partnership'."
Further, as has been mentioned previously,3 4 Pothier's writings
were utilized to a considerable extent in the drafting of the Code
of 1825, and therefore those works were thought to be particularly
valuable in construing provisions of that code. Other French
commentators cited by the Louisiana courts and lawyers in part-
nership cases during this period include Toullier, Duranton,
Domat, Troplong, Delvincourt, and Pardessus.
35
Several Louisiana decisions were grounded almost entirely
on French authorities. For instance, in Dick v. Byrne,3 6 when
a question arose as to the legal nature of the partnership, counsel
referred the court to the conflicting theories set forth in the writ-
ings of the French commentators; and the court expressly based
its decision on the writings of Toullier, feeling that his view
of the nature of the partnership was more "consonant to the
positive enactment of the Code. '37 Incidentally, Toullier's theory
was that the commercial partnership is an artificial entity sepa-
rate and distinct from the persons composing it. The court ac-
cepted that notion, apparently for the first time; and the concept
of the partnership as an entity (the entity idea was extended to
ordinary partnerships later) has remained in the law of Louisi-
ana. The "entity theory,"' which is adhered to by the Louisiana
32. Tucker, supra note 5, at 280, 289. Also William David Evans trans-
lated and annotated Pothier on Obligations; his translation was published in
Philadelphia in 1839.
33. Pothier, A Treatise on the Contract of Partnership (trans. Tudor,
1854).
34. See p. 313, supra.
35. Rather extensive citation of French authorities can be found in Find-
ley v. Breedlove, Bradford and Robeson, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 105, 110 (1826); Syndics
of Morgan v. Davenport's Heirs, 3 La. 184, 187, 191 (1831); brief in Zacharie v.
Blandin, 6 La. 193, 199 (1834); brief in Petrovic v. Hyde, 16 La. 223, 226 (1840);
brief in La Chomette v. Thomas, 1 La. Ann. 120, 121 (1846).
36. 7 Rob. 465 (La. 1844).
37. 7 Rob. 465, 467.
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courts, and the "aggregate theory," which prevails in most
Anglo-American jurisdictions, will be contrasted in a subsequent
part of this article.38
Marshall v. LambethN9 is another case in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court relied on French legal materials. Counsel in that
case cited several Anglo-American authorities to the court, in-
cluding works of Story and Collyer.40  Since a partnership in
commendam was involved, however, the court decided to follow
the law of France, the "country from whose jurisprudence we
have borrowed this kind of contract."'4 1
The years between the adoption of the Code of 1825 and the
Civil War witnessed, in spite of the French parentage of the
code, a slow but constant and gradually-increasing influx of
Anglo-American principles into Louisiana partnership law. From
1825 to 1862 opinions of the Louisiana Supreme Court and re-
ported briefs of counsel cited a total of 202 Anglo-American au-
thorities, a total more than double the number of citations to
French authorities. Even in the ten years immediately following
the adoption of the code, Anglo-American authorities were cited
by court and counsel as often as were French materials; and as
early as 1835 at least one of the judges on the Louisiana Supreme
Court felt that reliance on Anglo-American treatises was proper
in determining partnership questions. 42 By 1842 Anglo-American
authorities definitely had forged ahead of the other extra-Louisi-
ana authorities cited by Louisiana courts, never again to be over-
taken.43
The leading Anglo-American works on partnership published
in the early part of the nineteenth century found their way into
38. To be published in the next issue of the Louisiana Law Review.
39. 7 Rob. 471 (La. 1844).
40. 7 Rob. 471, 473-474.
41. 7 Rob. 471, 475.
42. Mathews, J., in Herman & Son v. Louisiana State Insurance Co., 8
La. 285, 289 (1835), seemed to feel that principles set forth in Collyer's Treatise
on Partnership were applicable in Louisiana: "It is laid down as a general
rule, by a late writer on partnership, that the signature of one partner, in
matters of simple contract, relating to the partnership binds the firm. See
Collyer's Treatise on Partnership, page 239."
43. Extensive citation of Anglo-American authority may be found in the
following: Briefs in Herman & Son v. Louisiana State Insurance Co., 8 La.
285, 286 (1835); briefs and opinion in Smith v. S6n6cal, 2 Rob. 453, 455, 456 (La.
1842); opinion in Millaudon v. The New Orleans and Carrollton R.R., 3 Rob.
488, 505 (La. 1843); briefs and opinion in Robertson v. De Lizardi, 4 Rob. 300,
310, 314 (La. 1843); opinion in Gridley v. Conner, 2 La. Ann. 87, 90 (1847);
briefs in Flower v. Their Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 189, 190 (1848); opinion in
Consolidated Bank v. The State of Louisiana, 5 La. Ann. 44 (1850); opinion
and dissenting opinion in Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529, 530, 533, 534-535
(1859).
1949]
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Louisiana soon after publication and were much used. Gow's
A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership, the first English
edition of which was published in 182344 and the first American
edition of which appeared in 1825,'5 was cited by the Louisiana
Supreme Court as early as 182746 and was referred to by counsel
and court frequently thereafter until about 1850. 47 Another Eng-
lish treatise which became popular in Louisiana 48 was Collyer's
A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership, which was first
published in England in 1832. 4 9 The first American edition ap-
peared in 1834"° and by 1835 Collyer had been cited by counsel in
Louisiana and by the Louisiana Supreme Court.5 1 Kent's Com-
mentaries on American Law, which contains a brief chapter on
partnership law, was published in 1828, and by 1832 was being
cited in partnership litigation in Louisiana.52 The high regard in
which Kent's Commentaries was held by the Louisiana Supreme
Court is testified to by the fact that the Rules of Court adopted
in 1846 required that candidates for admission to the bar read
that work. 5
The first really comprehensive American treatment of part-
nership law, Story's Commentaries on the Law of Partnership,
was published in 1841. The very next year counsel and the courts
in Louisiana began to make use of that work.5 4 Story on Partner-
ship was cited again and again in subsequent years,5" apparently
44. London: printed for Charles Hunter.
45. From the second London edition with notes, and references to Ameri-
can decisions, by Edward D. Ingraham, Philadelphia, A. Small, 1825.
46. Purdy v. Hood, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 626, 629, 630 (1827).
47. Brief in Hermann & Son v. Louisiana State Insurance Co., 8 La. 285,
286 (1835); Vigers v. Sainet, 13 La. 300, 303 (1839); Cutler v. Cochran, 13 La.
482, 484 (1839); Fisk, Watt & Co. v. Mead, 18 La. 332, 335 (1841); Harrison v.
Poole, 4 Rob. 193, 195 (La. 1843); brief in Flower v. Their Creditors, 3 La.
Ann. 189, 190 (1848). Apparently the last American edition of Gow on Partner-
ship was published in 1847, Philadelphia: Robert H. Small.
48. Cited in brief and opinion in Hermann & Son v. Louisiana State In-
surance Co., 8 La. 285, 286, 289 (1835); brief in Cutler v. Cochran, 13 La. 482,
484 (1839); brief in Robertson v. De Lizardi, 4 Rob. 300, 310 (La. 1843); brief
In Marshall v. Lambeth, 7 Rob. 471, 474 (La. 1844).
49. London, S. Sweet, Stevens & Sons and A. Maxwell.
50. Springfield, G. and C. Merriam, 1834.
51. Brief and opinion in Hermann & Son v. Louisiana State Insurance Co.,
8 La. 285, 286, 289 (1835).
52. Offutt v. Breedlove, 4 La. 31, 32 (1832) (only authority cited by court
to support decision); brief in Hermann & Son v. Louisiana State Insurance
Co., 8 La. 285, 286 (1835); Byrne v. Hooper, 2 Rob. 229, 233 (La. 1842); Harri-
son v. Poole, 4 Rob. 193, 195 (La. 1843); Robertson v. De Lizardi, 4 Rob. 300,
304, 307, 310 (La. 1843); Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529, 534 (1859).
53. 1 La. Ann. viii (1847).
54. Byrne v. Hooper, 2 Rob. 229, 233 (La. 1842); brief and opinion in Smith
v. Sfnfcal, 2 Rob. 453, 456 (La. 1842).
55. The listing of all briefs and opinions citing Story is impractical. The
following are a few: Brief and opinion in Robertson v. De Lizardi, 4 Rob. 300,
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furnishing in many cases the primary basis for the court's deci-
sion.56 For instance, in Whipple v. Hill,5' the court spoke of and
treated partners who owned a steamboat as "tenants in common,"
a common law concept otherwise unknown to Louisiana law.5 8
And, in Consolidated Bank v. Louisiana,59 after hearing argu-
ments of counsel based in part at least on Roman and French
authorities, the court adopted as the law of the case paraphrased
extracts from Story.60 Undoubtedly Story exerted a far greater
influence than any other Anglo-American authority on the devel-
opment of the Louisiana law of partnership. Probably, too, the
modern Louisiana law of partnership owes more to Story than
to Pothier.
The Anglo-American authorities cited between 1825 and
1862 were quite diverse. Watson on Partnership was cited by
counsel at least once.0' Smith's Mercantile Law, apparently
highly regarded by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, was referred
to by that court in a number of cases.62 Bell's Commentaries on
the Scottish Law, which probably should be considered a civil
law authority, was repeatedly cited with approval in Millaudon
v. The New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad63 because, as the
court said, Scottish law "sprang from the same fountain with our
own." Numerous British cases and cases from other American
jurisdictions were cited during this period and extracts were
quoted from many of them;6 4 United States Supreme Court 5 and
New York decisions66 were especially popular.
A count of authorities cited in the Louisiana jurisprudence
between 1825 and 1860, though in some measure indicating the
309, 314 (La. 1843); brief in Marshall v. Lambeth, 7 Rob. 471, 473 (La. 1844);
opinion in De Lizardi v. Gossett, 1 La. Ann. 138, 139 (1846); brief -in Flower
v. Their Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 189, 190 (1848); brief and opinion in Consoli-
dated Bank v. The State of Louisiana, 5 La. Ann. 44, 51, 59 (1850).
56. Water & Co. v. Maddox, 7 La. Ann. 644, 645 (1852), is illustrative.
57. 14 La. Ann. 437, 438 (1859).
58. Most nearly equivalent Louisiana concept: "owners in indivision."
59. 5 La. Ann. 44 (1850).
60. 5 La. Ann. 44, 59.
61. Flower v. Their Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 189, 190 (1848).
62. Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529, 534 (1859); Murrell v. Murrell, 33
La. Ann. 1233, 1240 (1881).
63. 3 Rob. 488, 506 (La. 1843).
64. Brief in Banchor v. Bell, 2 Rob. 182, 184-185 (La. 1842); opinion and
dissenting opinion in Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529, 532, 533, 534 (1859).
65. McDonald v. Millaudon, 5 La. 403 (1833), was decided almost entirely
on the authority of a United States Supreme Court case.
66. See, for instance, Grinnan v. Baton Rouge Mills Co., 7 La. Ann. 638,
639 (1852). The lawyers sometimes objected to the adoption of Anglo-Ameri-
can principles by the court. In Wood v. Steamboat Fort Adams, 6 Mart.(N.S.)
82, 83 (1827), the court mentioned that a rule of law was "oppugned" by
counsel "as borrowed from the common law."
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infiltration by Anglo-American principles, does not depict fully
the extent of the contributions made during that period by
Anglo-American law to the development of Louisiana's partner-
ship law. In deciding the important, hard-fought cases-the cases
in which the law "grew" as distinguished from cases in which
the court merely applied well-settled principles-the Louisiana
courts almost invariably resorted to Anglo-American authorities
for guidance and adopted the solutions suggested by Anglo-
American jurists and scholars.
One of the most obvious departures from civil law principles
made by the Louisiana Supreme Court in adopting Anglo-Ameri-
can law occurred in Consolidated Bank v. Louisiana.7 The
facts of that case are lengthy and complicated, but for the
purpose of this discussion it suffices to state that: the bank's
charter of incorporation provided for payment from profits of a
"bonus" to the State of Louisiana; the bank, which instead of
making profits had suffered losses, sued the state to force it to
contribute to the losses. The court apparently felt that because
the State of Louisiana received a share of the profits it was in
partnership with the bank; yet it so interpreted the bank's charter
and the arrangements between the state and the bank as to
exempt the state from contribution to losses. In reaching its
decision the court discussed Article 2785 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825 (Article 2814 of the present Civil Code), which
provided:
"A stipulation that one of the contracting parties shall par-
ticipate in the profits of a partnership, but shall not contribute
to losses, is void, both as regards the partners and third
persons."
Article 2785 undoubtedly was designed to require each part-
ner to assume some risk of loss. The words of the article seem
to have been clear enough; but, if doubt could have existed as
to the intention of the redactors, it would have been removed
by other articles of the Code of 1825.68 Further, Article 2785 of
the Code of 1825 was a counterpart of the second paragraph of
Article 1855 of the Code Napoleon. 9 The French commentators
do not question that Article 1855 of the French Code requires
67. 5 La. Ann. 44 (1850).
68. See Art. 2784, La. Civil Code of 1825.
69. Art. 1855, French Civil Code: "La convention qui donnerait d Pun des
associds kt totalitd des bdndficies, est nulle.
"It en est de m6me de la stipulation qui affranchirait de tout contribution
aux pertes, les sommes ou effets mis dans le fonds de la socidtd par un om
plusieurs des associds."
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each of the partners to be responsible to some extent for losses
that the firm might suffer. The commentators point out that the
second paragraph of Article 1855 is a limitation of contractual
freedom and should be construed strictly;7 0 that therefore it is
not essential that each partner be liable to bear in the losses a
share proportionate to that which is attributed to him in the gains
(for instance, one partner may contract with his associates that
he shall receive one-half of the profits but will bear only one-
fourth of the losses) ;71 and that further the part which a partner
is to bear in losses need not be in proportion to his contribution
to the assets of the firm. 72 Yet, under French law, each partner
must be bound to contribute in some measure to possible losses.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Consolidated Bank v. Lou-
isiana, in the very teeth of Article 2785 of the Louisiana Civil
Code and in disregard of the position of French authorities com-
menting on the French counterpart of Article 2785, cited with
approval the common law rule that the partners by stipulations
in the contract may provide that losses shall be borne by one or
more of the partners exclusively and that others shall inter se
be exempted therefrom. 73 Story and Collyer were the authorities
on which the court grounded its decision. Article 2785 was vir-
tually read out of the code. At the very least its applicability was
restricted to contracts in which the partner exempted from lia-
bility does not give his associates a fair equivalent for his im-
munity;74 and, if extracts from Story and Collyer which the
court quotes with relish7 " are to be regarded as the law of Louisi-
ana, the article does not have even that restricted operation.
70. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de
Droit Civil, De la Socift6, du Pr~t, du Depot (3 ed. 1907) 170, no 269. Cf. Guil-
louard, Trait6 du Contrat de Socidt6 (2 ed. 1892) 318, no 241.
71. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, loc. cit. supra note 70.
72. Ibid. The difference in the wording of Art. 1855, French Civil Code
(supra note 69) and Art. 2785, La. Civil Code of 1825 (Art. 2814, La. Civil Code
of 1870) should be carefully noted. Under the interpretation given the French
provision, a partner contributing to the firm assets only his own time and
industry may be exempted from any other contribution to the losses.. The
parties may contract that in event the firm suffers losses he will lose his
services and no more. Guillouard, loc. cit. supra note 70.
73. 5 La. Ann. 44, 59 (1850).
74. "This argument rests on too broad an assumption, if it takes for
granted that, under the spirit and true meaning of the code, a contract be-
tween individuals, that one partner should share the profits and be exempt
from the losses, would be void under all circumstances. Equality is the spirit
of the rule: and we are not prepared to say that such a stipulation would be
void, as between the parties, where the exemption was based upon a fair
and just equivalent given to his associate, by the partner in whose favor it
was. stipulated. It would be against reason to brand such a contract as in-
famous." Consolidated Bank v. The State of Louisiana, 5 La. Ann. 44, 58-59
(1850).
75. 5 La. Ann. 44, 59.
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Hallet v. Desban76 was another hard-fought case in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on Anglo-American author-
ity in reaching its decision. In that case a creditor of a partner-
ship sued the firm's confidential clerk on the theory that the clerk
was a partner because he was to receive one-fourth of the profits
as compensation for his services. The court held that the clerk
was not a partner since he did not share in the profits as a princi-
pal. The court cited a total of sixteen Anglo-American authorities
and quoted extensively from Story, Kent, Smith on Mercantile
Law, and from numerous English and American cases. Chief
Justice Merrick, dissenting,77 based his opinion on the earlier
English and American rule that a person who shares in the profits
of a business is liable as a partner, at least with respect to third
persons. 7 He cited seven Anglo-American authorities, including
Story and Kent, to support his position.7 1
A tool which the Louisiana Supreme Court used at least
twice between 1825 and 1862 to facilitate the introduction of
Anglo-American partnership principles was Article 21 of the
Code of 1825. That article stated:
"In civil matters, where there is no express law, the Judge
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide
equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason,
or received usages, where positive law is silent."
That "equity" as used in this article is not the system of prin-
ciples known as "equity" in Anglo-American jurisdictions should
be manifest from a mere reading of the article, particularly the
second sentence. That conclusion is re-enforced by the fact that
the Louisiana constitution in effect at the time of the adoption of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 prohibited the legislature from
adopting any system or code of laws by general reference and
required it to specify the various provisions of laws enacted.8 0
Further proof that the redactors of the Code of 1825, when they
used the word "equity" in Article 21, did not mean "equity" in
the Anglo-American sense is found in the counterpart of Article
76. 14 La. Ann. 529 (1859).
77. 14 La. Ann. 529, 533.
78. Grace v. Smith, 2 W. Bl. 998 (1775); Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235
(1793).
79. Other Louisiana cases decided between 1825 and 1862 in which the
court relied on Anglo-American authority to a considerable extent include:
McDonald v. Millaudon, 5 La. 403 (1833); Hermann & Son v. Louisiana State
Insurance Co., 8 La. 285 (1835); Gridley v. Conner, 2 La. Ann. 87 (1847).
80. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, Foreword, A Republication of the Projet
of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825 (1937) vi..
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21 in the Projet du Gouvernement (1800),81 which specified what
is meant by "equity":
"Dans les mati~res civiles, le juge, a d6faut de loi pr6cise,
est un ministre d'6quit6. L'6quit6 est le retour A la loi
naturelle, ou aux usages requs dans le silence de la loi posi-
tive."8 2
Yet, the Louisiana Supreme Court at times utilized Article
2183 in partnership cases to justify the adoption of certain equi-
table principles from Anglo-American law. In De Lizardi v. Gos-
sett,84 a creditor of a partnership sued the "succession" of a de-
ceased partner in commendam for a balance on the amount he
had bound himself to contribute to the firm. The creditor's peti-
tion showed amounts due other creditors for the firm and the
fact that assets available were insufficient to satisfy all creditors.
The court made the following disposition of the case:8 5
"Our laws have not provided for such an emergency; but
art. 21 of the Civil' Code ordains that, in civil matters, where
there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed and
decide according to equity. Commanded to proceed in this
cause and to decide it justly, notwithstanding the silence
of the law, we consider it safe to resort to proceedings analo-
gous to those by which the courts of the other States have
reached the equity of cases of this description, and to make
a decree for the general administration of the fund in the
hands of the defendant. Story, Equity Pleadings, p. 91-104
and notes."
Thug was decided a case involving a partnership in commendam.
No mention was made of the law of France, the "country from
whose jurisprudence we have borrowed this kind of contract."8' 6
A use of Article 21 to introduce Anglo-American equity also
was made in Gridley v. Conner.87 In that case the court held that
it had the power in a suit for the settlement of a partnership to
appoint a receiver if such appointment was necessary to effect
81. Preliminary Book, Tit. V, Art. 11.
82. Translation: "In civil matters, where there is no express law, the
judge must act as a minister of equity. Equity is the return to natural law,
or to received usages where positive law is silent."
83. La. Civil Code of 1825.
84. 1 La. Ann. 138 (1846).
85. 1 La. Ann. 138, 139.
86. See p. 317, supra.
87. 2 La. Ann. 87 (1847). For a case after the enactment of the Civil Code
of 1870 which used Article 21 of that code to reach a similar result, see In
re Liquidation of Mitchell-Borne Const. Co., 145 La. 379, 82 So. 377 (1919).
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the object of the suit. Story on Partnership and Article 21 were
cited as authority for the holding.8
Anglo-American law particularly affected the development
of the Louisiana commercial partnership. The redactors of the
Civil Code of 1825 expected the legislature to adopt a commercial
code, which properly was to control in regard to the commercial
partnership;8 9 they did not intend for the partnership articles
they drafted to govern the commercial partnership 0 The com-
mercial code had been prepared and was ready for submission to
the legislature."' Had the proposed commercial code been
adopted, a large part of the jurisprudence in the field of partner-
ship might have been preserved for the "civil law," but the code
never received legislative approval.9 2 Due to their belief that
a commercial code would be adopted at or near the same time as
the civil code,93 the redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 did not
insert provisions to regulate the commercial partnership.9 4 Attor-
neys in Thomas v. Myline95 pointed out the problems that Louisi-
ana lawyers and courts faced when litigating questions involving
commercial partnerships:
"Much difficulty is created by the imperfect state in which
our law is left by the Civil Code. We are referred to laws
which have never been enacted, and, in the absence of enact-
ment, are sent to seek such laws as we may find."96
In their search for authority naturally lawyers and jurists turned
to Anglo-American treatises and to partnership decisions from
other states.9 7
88. 2 La. Ann. 87, 90.
89. See Kimbel v. Blanc, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 386, 387-388 (1829).
90. This is shown by the notes of the redactors. 1 Louisiana Legal Ar-
chives, op. cit. supra note 80, at 329.
91. See Shirley, Escott and Co. v. Owners of the Steamer Bride, 5 La.
Ann. 260, 262 (1850).
92. See Kimbel v. Blanc, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 386, 387-388 (1829).
93. The fact that the Louisiana Civil Code does not include provisions
relating to business institutions rightly has been said to be one of its most
serious defects. Morrison, The Need for a Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 213, 235.
94. See Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1825.
95. 11 Rob. 349, 382 (La. 1845).
96. Counsel in Thomas v. Myline felt that they had to establish that the
law of all jurisdictions supported their client's cause: "We have shown that,
under the French law prior to the Code, partners of the firm were its credi-
tors for advances made or risks or obligations entered into for its benefit ...
and that writers since that period have laid down as law the same doctrine;
that both at law and in equity, in a country in which this subject is perhaps
as fully understood, and the interests of parties as carefully guarded as in
any upon earth, the principle is recognized; and that the same has been
sanctioned by the writers and decisions in this country." 11 Rob. 349, 382.
97. "As early as 1822, the Supreme Court of Louisiana began its task of
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A study of the development of a field of law cannot be di-
vorced from the personality, training, and philosophy of the men
who sit on the bench. Strong jurists mold the law along lines
they think desirable and thus exert considerable influence on
legal development. Two Louisiana jurists who sat on the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court prior to 1850 had marked effects on Louisi-
ana's partnership law. One was Francois-Xavier Martin; the
other, Thomas Slidell. Martin's ideas as to the comparative merits
of civil law and common law were the very antithesis of Slidell's
opinions on the subject. The extensive effect that these men had
on the development of Louisiana partnership law justifies a brief
survey of their careers and their contributions.
Francois-Xavier Martin, considered by Louisiana's legal
scholars as the most distinguished jurist that Louisiana ever had,
was a firm believer in the superiority of the civil law which
Louisiana had inherited from France. Perhaps the reasons for
this strong belief were that he was French, having been born in
Marseilles, and that he had been thoroughly indoctrinated in
French law. Of all the judges who ever sat on the Louisiana
Supreme Court, he was the one best qualified to hear with under-
standing a legal argument based on French or Spanish authori-
ties. Martin's public career was a long one. He served as one of
the judges of the Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans; on
the establishment of the state government in 1812, he was selected
the first attorney general of the state; in 1815, he was appointed
judge of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. He served on the
Supreme Court for more than thirty-one years; a considerable
part of that time he was presiding judge. Throughout his career
Martin fought a valiant, if losing, battle to maintain a close con-
nection between Louisiana law and the law of France. Perhaps
Martin's most vigotous attempt to save Louisiana's civil law
occurred in Reynolds v. Swain." In that case Martin interpreted
Article 3521 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, which purported
to repeal the Roman, Spanish, and French civil laws in force
when Louisiana was ceded to the United States, as effecting a
repeal only of the laws of those nations which actually had been
evolving a commercial law through jurisprudential development, by resorting
to the law merchant. The failure of the Legislature in 1824 to adopt a Code
of Commerce necessitated a continuance of that policy." Daggett, Dainow,
Hebert and McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law
of Louisiana (1937) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 12, 35. Compare language in Chaffraix
and Agar v. Price, Hine and Tupper, 29 La. Ann. 176, 191, 192 (1877). See also
Julius S. Cohn & Co. v. Drennan & Hillcoat, 1 La. App. 140, 142 (1924).
98. 13 La. 193 (1839).
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incorporated into statutes in Louisiana, and as definitely not re-
pealing unwritten law and the decisions of the courts. But Mar-
tin went further. Undoubtedly fearing that the legislature some
day might attempt to replace civil law with common law, he
attempted to establish that the legislature was without power to
repeal the civil law. He argued that civil law had prevailed in
Louisiana when it became a United States territory and that the
legislature could not abolish the pre-existing law. He questioned
the power of the legislature in the following language:
"The repeal spoken of in the code, and in the act of 1828,
cannot extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself
had enacted; for it is this alone which it may repeal."99
And again: "It cannot be extended to those unwritten laws which
do not derive their authority from the positive institution of any
people."'10 0 Later in the same opinion Martin made a statement
the accuracy of which is not borne out by the records now avail-
able:
"... it is the daily practice of our courts to resort to the laws
of Rome and France, and the commentaries on those laws, for
the elucidation of principles applicable to analogous cases."''1
Apparently the only partnership case in which Martin cited
an Anglo-American writer with approval was Cutler v. Coch-
ran;1 2 in that case he cited Gow.
Thomas Slidell cited Anglo-American authorities freely and
seldom resorted to the French writers. He did much to counter-
act Martin's influence on partnership law. Slidell was born in
New York about 1805 and was graduated from Yale College in
1825. While traveling in Spain, he wrote a book entitled A Year
in Spain. On his return to the United States he settled in New
Orleans and established himself as a lawyer, soon gaining dis-
tinction and a lucrative practice.10 3 On the reorganization of the
supreme court under the Constitution of 1845, he was appointed
one of the judges and took his seat on March 19, 1846. He served
until 1855, from 1852 as Chief Justice. While on the supreme
court, he seemed to specialize in partnership cases; he wrote most
of the partnership opinions handed down while he was on the
bench. His common law background was reflected in those opin-
99. 13 La. 193, 198.
100. Ibid.
101. 13 La. 193, 199.
102. 13 La. 482, 485 (1839).
103. The National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. VII, p. 496.
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ions. Numerous illustrations of his inclination to cite Anglo-
American authorities can be found among Slidell's partnership
opinions. 10 4 The only partnership case found in which Slidell
cited a French authority is Stewart v. Caldwell & Hickey;10 5 in
that case he cited Troplong.
The decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court were not
reported between 1862 and 1865. The judges sitting on the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court in 1865, when the reporting of cases was
resumed, apparently were inferior in ability and training. The
court was appointed by the "carpet bag" government which had
control of the state, and contained no judge who had been on
the court in 1862. The relatively poor judges on the court and
the unsettled conditions in the state left their marks on the part-
nership jurisprudence. The decisions between 1865 and 1870 were
sterile: they were poorly reasoned; they cited but few authori-
ties; and in large part they were re-litigations of questions which
had been settled by the Louisiana Supreme Court prior to the
Civil War. In the thirty-nine partnership cases decided between
1865 and 1870 inclusive, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited forty-
seven Louisiana cases, twelve articles of Louisiana codes, seven
Anglo-American authorities, and no French, Spanish, or Roman
works.
Anglo-American law made one significant contribution in
this otherwise uneventful period to the development of Louisiana
partnership law. In Grieff & Byrnes v. Boudousquie & Fortier,10
decided in 1866, the Louisiana Supreme Court firmly established
in Louisiana law the concept of partnership by estoppel or "hold-
ing out," a notion which still prevails in Louisiana as well as in
common law jurisdictions. In that case a license for a business
was taken out by defendant Fortier and the business conducted
in his name. Goods were bought from the plaintiff in the name
of Boudousquie. Fortier contended that Boudousquie conducted
the business on his own account. In holding Fortier liable for
the goods, the court stated:' 0 7
"If one lends his name as a partner, or suffers his name to
104. Consolidated Bank v. The State of Louisiana, 5 La. Ann. 44 (1850),
discussed p. 320 supra; Edwards v. McFall, 5 La. Ann. 167 (1850) (Collyer
on Partnership, Smith on Mercantile Law, and five Anglo-American cases
cited: no other authority); Grinnan v. Baton Rouge Mills Co., 7 La. Ann
638 (1852) (opinion grounded on two New York decisions); Waters & Co.
v. Maddox, 7 La. Ann. 644 (1852) (decision based on Story).
105. 9 La. Ann. 419, 421 (1854).
106. 18 La. Ann. 631 (1866).
107. 18 La. Ann. 631, 632.
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be used in the business, he is responsible to third persons as
a partner, for he may induce third persons to give that credit
to the firm or establishment which otherwise it would not re-
ceive, nor, perhaps, deserve. This doctrine is founded in the
enlarged principles of natural law and justice."
To support the quoted principles the court cited three Anglo-
American authorities and one prior Louisiana case.10s The Lou-
isiana case cited was the very early case of Richardson v. Debuys
& Longer,109 which inter alia held (but without discussion or cita-
tion of authority) that one who holds himself out as a partner
in a commercial firm is responsible as such.1 0
To incorporate changes necessitated by the outcome of the
Civil War, the Louisiana Legislature in 1868 ordered a revision
of the civil code."' A projet was compiled in 1869 by John Ray
of the Monroe Bar, and with minor modifications it was adopted
by the legislature in 1870. The principal differences between the
Code of 1825 and the Code of 1870 were: (1) articles relating
to slavery were not contained in the new code; and (2) legisla-
tion passed subsequent to 1825 which was amendatory of the old
code or which related to matters regulated by it was integrated
into the new code." 2 Since the title of the Code of 1825 on part-
nership did not mention slavery and since no legislation had
been passed affecting partnership law, the partnership articles
of the Code of 1870 differed little from those of the Code of
1825.113 The only substantial change made was that Articles 2798,
2803, and 2823 of the Code of 1825, which contained references to
the Code of Commerce the redactors of the Code of 1825 had ex-
pected the legislature to adopt, were redrafted to eliminate men-
tion of a commercial code. 11 4
Since the partnership articles of the Code of 1825 were incor-
porated into the Code of 1870 substantially without change, the
efficacy of the jurisprudence created between 1825 and 1870 was
not impaired by the adoption of the latter code. In subsequent
litigation, Louisiana courts did not question the authoritativeness
of partnership cases decided prior to the adoption of the new
code. The conclusion is inescapable that the adoption of the Civil
108. Ibid.
109. 4 Mart.(N.S.) 127 (La. 1826).
110. 4 Mart.(N.S.) 127, 130.
111. Tucker, supra note 5, at 294.
112. Id. at 295.
113. See 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes
of Louisiana (1942) 1960, 2022-2625.
114. See Arts. 2827, 2832, 2852, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Code of 1870 did not erase the inroads which Anglo-American law
previously had made in Louisiana's partnership law.
The influence of Anglo-American authorities on the partner-
ship law of Louisiana actually increased after 1870. Between 1870
and 1900, the Supreme Court of Louisiana on points of partner-
ship law cited Anglo-American authorities 443 times, but French
works only 67 times. The continued growth in the influence of
Anglo-American law is explained by the influx during the Re-
construction period of persons from common law states, the
attainment of political and judicial influence by lawyers edu-
cated in common law states, the inability of most of the judges
on the court to hear with understanding arguments based on
French and Spanish authorities, and finally the needs of an ex-
panding economy in which commercial practices were changing
and business organizations increasing in size.
Two cases, Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper'15 and
Chaffraix & Agar v. John B. Lafltte & Company,116 decided by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1877 and 1878 respectively, illus-
trate the extent to which the court was considering Anglo-Ameri-
can authorities. These two cases, which arose out of the same
transactions, were probably the most hard-fought cases involving
questions of partnership law which the Louisiana Supreme Court
was called upon to decide between 1870 and 1900. The best legal
talent in Louisiana and eminent counsel from other states argued
these cases with marked ability. A total of ten judges. (the per-
sonnel of the five-judge supreme court changed between the origi-
nal. hearing and the rehearing in Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine
& Tupper) passed on the partnership questions presented in the
two cases. Four dissenting opinions and one concurring opinion
were written.117
The facts and holdings of these important cases will be con-
sidered in detail in the next section;"18 for present purposes an
examination of the authorities resorted to by the court suffices. In
the original opinion in Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper,
the court cited one Louisiana code article, one French authority
(Bedaride), and two authorities on Roman law; the dissenting
judges did not cite authority. In the opinion delivered on rehear-
115. 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877).
116. 30 La. Ann. 631 (1878).
117. Ludeling, C.J., concurring 29 La. Ann. 176, 182 (1877); Howell, J.,
dissenting 29 La. Ann. 176, 183; Wyly, J., dissenting 29 La. Ann. 176, 183; Egan,
J., dissenting 30 La. Ann. 631, 643 (1878); Spencer, J., dissenting 30 La. Ann.
631, 647.
118. See p. 352 et seq., infra.
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ing in the case, 119 the court cited one Louisiana code article, one
Louisiana case, six French authorities, and nineteen Anglo-Amer-
ican authorities, including Story, Parsons, and numerous English
and American cases. The court indicated that it was aware of its
reliance on Anglo-American authorities, that in fact it con-
sciously resorted to those authorities in preference to French
works. For instance, a syllabus written by the court states:
"In the interpretation of commercial contracts, this court will
be largely influenced, and guided, by the law merchant of the
United States, and the constructions of that law made by the
Supreme Court of the United States."
And, in its opinion on the rehearing, the court referred with
approval to the decision in McDonald v. Millaudon,
120 stating: 121
"In Millaudon's case, this court settled conclusively that the
laws and usages of commerce to which reference is to be had
by our tribunals in interpreting commercial contracts are
those sanctioned by the law merchant of the United States,
and explained and adjudicated by the Supreme Court."
The court neglected to point out that the phrase "laws and usages
of commerce" properly was discussed in McDonald v. Millaudon
because that phrase was used in the Civil Code of 1808,122 but that
the Civil Code of 1870 does not refer to "laws and usages of
commerce."123
In Chaffraix & Agar v. John B. Lafitte & Company, 24 the
majority opinion cited seven sections of the Louisiana Civil Code,
one prior Louisiana case, one French authority (Troplong), and
fifty-three Anglo-American authorities, including Gow, Collyer,
Lindley, Story, and Parsons. Judge Marr, who wrote the major-
ity opinion, tried to maintain the fiction that he was following
civil law principles (not an infrequent practice of Louisiana jur-
ists). He stated boastfully: 125
"... finally it [the rule of Waugh v. Carver] 26 was declared
119. 29 La. Ann. 176, 185 (1877).
120. 5 La. 403 (1833).
121. 29 La. Ann. 176, 191-192 (1877).
122. Art. 61, p. 400, La. Civil Code of 1808.
123. See Art. 2852, La. Civil Code of 1870, which provides: "All the pro-
visions of this title are also applicable to commercial partnerships, except as
otherwise provided for." See also Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1825; Spencer,
J., dissenting in Chaffraix & Agar v. John B. Lafitte & Co., 30 La. Ann. 631,
651 (1878).
124. 30 La. Ann. 631 (1878).
125. 30 La. Ann. 631, 640.
126. 2 H. Bl. 235 (1793).
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not to be the law of England, and the plain, natural, just, com-
mon-sense rule recognized, by which the real intentions and
the contracts of parties are restored to that supremacy which
they have always maintained in the civil law, and in the
kindred systems which have sprung from that noble parent-
age."
An inquiry is pertinent as to why-the judge found it necessary
to cite fifty-three Anglo-American authorities and examine them
at length. His decision was in accord with the more recent and
better reasoned of those authorities. To avoid the impression
that he was swayed by them is difficult. The dissenting judges,
at least, felt that Judge Marr had departed from the pre-existing
Louisiana rule and had borrowed from Anglo-American law.12
Numerous other cases between 1870 and 1900 demonstrate
the decisive part Anglo-American authorities played in the de-
velopment of Louisiana partnership law.128 Of the eight partner-
ship cases litigated in 1881 Anglo-American authorities guided
the court in the decision of the four most important and hotly
contested suits.12 9 Further, in the eight cases, the total of Anglo-
American authorities cited by the court far exceeded (eighty to
fifty-six) the number of citations to all other types of authority,
including Louisiana decisions and code articles.
Carter Brothers & Company v. Galloway & Burns, °1 0 decided
in 1884, illustrates the tendency of the Louisiana Supreme Court
to cite Anglo-American authority to support a rule of law even
127. Egan, J.: "It is both wise and well to borrow light from the en-
lightened and progressive jurisprudence of other States and countries when
our own law is silent, or the jurisprudence of our own State either unformed
or uncertain. We are, however, not at liberty to do so where neither is the
case .. " 30 La. Ann. 631, 643 (1878).
Spencer, J.: "I say advisedly we are not at liberty to go outside of our
own law if it affords a solution.... We are therefore no longer at liberty to
subordinate the provisions of the Civil Code 'to the laws and usages of com-
merce.' These 'laws and usages' are rules of decision for us now only when
and to the extent that the Civil Code is silent." 30 La. Ann. 631, 651.
128. Lisso v. Navra & Offner, 34 La. Ann. 1111 (1882); Levine v. Michel,
35 La. Ann. 1121 (1883); Carter Bros. & Co. v. Galloway & Burns, 36 La. Ann.
473 (1884); briefs in Greene v. Kummel, 41 La. Ann. 65, 5 So. 555 (1889); Smith
v. Smith, 51 La. Ann. 72 (1898). "In interpreting these statutes [state insolv-
ency laws as applied to partnerships] we have followed principles approved
by most worthy commentators [Story, Gow, Cook, Deacon, and Lindley] and
which were practically tested when the bankruptcy laws were in force. They
threw great light on the subject." George J. Reilly & Co. v. Their Creditors,
45 La. Ann. 470, 473, 12 So. 519, 521 (1893).
129. Murrell v. Murrell, 33 La. Ann. 1233 (1881); Mechanics' and Traders'
Insurance Co. v. Richardson & Cary, 33 La. Ann. 1308 (1881); Mutual Na-
tional Bank v. Richardson, 33 La. Ann. 1312 (1881); Allen, Nugent & Co. v.
Cary, 33 La. Ann. 1455 (1881).
130. 36 La. Ann. 473 (1884).
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though ample Louisiana authority for the proposition existed.
In that case the court used decisions from other states to support
the rule that the assets of a partnership cannot be applied to the
claims of a partner's separate creditors to the prejudice of part-
nership creditors.' 3' Abundant Louisiana authority for that point
was available. Cases such as Carter Brothers & Company v. Gal-
loway & Burns suggest that many Louisiana lawyers and judges
may have been more familiar with Anglo-American law than
they were with the jurisprudence of Louisiana.
The only partnership case decided by the Louisiana Supreme
Court between 1870 and 1900 in which French works seem to
have exerted a greater influence on the court than Anglo-Ameri-
can authorities was E. J. Hart & Company v. Anger & Nicol. 32
In that case the court refused to give effect to a clause in a con-
tract of partnership that on the death of a partner the survivor
would have an option to continue the partnership. The brief of the
losing counse 1 3 3 cites five Louisiana cases, one section of the
Louisiana Civil Code, one Roman work, twelve French authori-
ties, and forty Anglo-American authorities. The court in writing
its opinion cited two French works but no Anglo-American
authority.
By 1900 the development of Louisiana's partnership law was
practically complete. After that time the litigation of partner-
ship problems decreased considerably; most of the partnership
cases that have come before the courts since then have involved
factual questions or have been suits for accountings or for settle-
ments and liquidations.1 34 The decrease in the number of part-
nership cases can be explained on two grounds: (1) most part-
nership problems had been considered by the state supreme court
by 1900 and rules dealing with the problems had become firmly
settled; (2) the increase in the number of corporations resulted
in a substantial decrease in the number of enterprises doing busi-
ness as partnerships and therefore a decrease in the number of
persons litigating partnership questions.
The most important contribution that Anglo-American law
made to the partnership law of Louisiana after 1900 was the
131. 36 La. Ann. 473, 476. Ample Louisiana authority to support the hold-
ing could have been found. See, for instance, Art. 2823, La. Civil Code of 1870;
Flower v. Their Creditors, 3 La. Ann. 189 (1848).
132. 38 La. Ann. 341 (1886).
133. 38 La. Ann. 341, 342.
134. Illustrative of this type of case are Richard v. Mouton, 106 La. 435,
30 So. 894 (1901); Stark v. Howcott, 118 La. 489, 43 So. 61 (1907); Riser v.
Riser, 140 La. 1090, 74 So. 563 (1917).
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concept "joint adventure." In the last twenty years, Louisiana
courts frequently have resorted to that concept.5 5 The Louisiana
Supreme Court has acknowledged quite frankly both that the
joint adventure was developed by the courts of other states and
that it has found recognition in Louisiana. 13 In most cases in
which the courts have used the term "joint adventure"' 7-
namely, where the venture contemplated buying personal property
("movables" in Louisiana legal terminology) for resale-"special
commercial partnership," a civilian term recognized by the Lou-
isiana Civil Code, 1 3 8 was applicable to the legal relations under
examination and might have been used. The adoption of the
"joint adventure" concept and the use of that term instead of
"special commercial partnership" where the latter term would
be appropriate raises the possibility that even Louisiana's dis-
tinctive terminology slowly is being supplanted. Little doubt
can exist that Louisiana lawyers and courts of an earlier era
would have used "special commercial partnership" to refer to
what is now known as a "joint adventure" for the purchase and
sale of personal property. For instance, in Ward v. Brandt ' 3 9
decided in 1822, counsel for plaintiff (apparently Edward Liv-
ingston, who played such an important role in the early develop-
ment of Louisiana law) in his argument stated:
"The special partnership (soci6t6 anonyme ou inconnue)
'is that by which two or more persons do agree to become part-
ners in a certain speculation, (dans une certaine n~gociation)
to be made by one of the partners in his own name simply.'
No argument is necessary to show that this relates to a par-
ticular operation of commerce. "140
Though Louisiana cases on partnership law amount to a juris-
prudence of considerable size, the Louisiana courts, to fill in
hiatuses in the Louisiana jurisprudence or to solve some new
135. Ludeau v. Avoyelles Cotton Co., 164 La. 275, 113 So. 846 (1927); Daily
States Pub. Co. v. Uhalt, 169 La. 893, 126 So. 228 (1930); Clarke v. Hutchinson,
175 La. 911, 144 So. 713 (1932); Ault & Wiborg Co. of Canada v. Carson Carbon
Co., 181 La. 681, 688, 160 So. 298 (1935); Posey v. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175
(1937). Cf. Sabine Supply Co. v. Cameron Oil Co., 175 La. 360, 143 So. 327
(1923).
136. "Joint adventure, as a legal concept, is of comparatively recent
origin, and is the creature of American courts. 33 C. J. p. 841. The concept
has received some recognition in this state." Daily States Pub. Co. v. Uhalt,
169 La. 893, 901, 126 So. 228, 231 (1930).
137. Ludeau v. Avoyelles Cotton Co., 164 La. 275, 113 So. 846 (1927); Ault
& Wiborg Co. of Canada v. Carson Carbon Co., 181 La. 681, 160 So. 298 (1935).
138. Art. 2827, La. Civil Code of 1870.
139. 11 Mart.(O.S.) 331 (1822).
140. 11 Mart.(O.S.) 331, 404. See also Norris' Heirs v. Ogden's Ex's, 11
Mart.(O.S.) 455, 459-460 (La. 1822).
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problem, occasionally still find that resort to Anglo-American
authorities is advantageous. Corpus Juris,'4 1 Ruling Case Law,142
American Law Reports, 43 and cases from other states 144 are uti-
lized by Louisiana courts today just as were Kent, Story, and
Parsons in earlier times, though perhaps less frequently. In Quin-
tero v. Caffery, 145 the court adopted Anglo-American rules with
respect to details in the settlement of partnership affairs. When
faced in J. P. Barnett Company v. Ludeau'4" with a question
which had been litigated many times with conflicting results in
other states of the union-whether a corporation can enter into
a partnership-the Louisiana court cited thirteen cases from
other jurisdictions and held that "the pecuniary results of a part-
nership between a corporation and an individual" are subject to
the protection of the courts.14 7
Louisiana courts at times still use Article 21 of the Civil
Code 148 as a vehicle to import principles of the Anglo-American
system of equity. In In re Liquidation of Mitchell-Borne Con-
struction Company,'49 decided in 1919, and in Sklar v. Kahle,5 0
decided in 1940, the courts cited Article 21 as authority for holding
that Louisiana courts have power to appoint receivers for insol-
vent partnerships.
The courts have not been the only agencies through which
Anglo-American partnership law has been imported into Louisiana.
The legislature on several occasions has adopted statutes from
common law states which have altered Louisiana's partnership
law. First, the legislature enacted an "Assumed Name" statute;15'
it forbids the use of an assumed or fictitious name by a person
or a firm unless a certificate showing who is represented by the
fictitious name is filed with the clerk of court (registrar of con-
veyances in the City of New Orleans) of the parish in which the
business is conducted. The wording of the Louisiana statute is
141. See Daily States Pub. Co. v. Uhalt, 169 La. 893, 901, 126 So. 228, 231
(1930).
142. See In re Liquidation of Mitchell-Borne Const. Co., 145 La. 379, 387,
82 So. 377, 380 (1919); Clarke v. Hutchinson, 175 La. 911, 915, 144 So. 713, 714
(1932).
143. See West v. Ray, 210 La. 25, 28, 26 So.(2d) 221, 222 (1946).
144. See J. P. Barnett Co. v. Ludeau, 171 La. 21, 25, 129 So. 655, 657 (1930).
145. 160 La. 1054, 108 So. 87 (1926).
146. 171 La. 21, 129 So. 655 (1930).
147. 171 La. 21, 25, 129 So. 655, 657.
148. For a discussion of an earlier use of Article 21 for the same purpose,
see p. 322 et seq., supra.
149. 145 La. 379, 390, 82 So. 377, 381 (1919).
150. 196 La. 137, 143, 198 So. 883, 885 (1940).
151. La. Act 64 of 1918 as amended (Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6503-6507].
Cf. Arts. 2837, 2838, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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quite similar to that of corresponding statutes in other states.1 2
Second, Louisiana has a "Partnership Name" statute,5 3 modeled
after New York legislation,'5 4 which forbids the use of the name
of a person not actually interested in the firm, or the use of the
term "& Co." unless it represents an actual partner or partners.
Numerous other states have "Partnership Name" statutes which
are almost identical with the Louisiana legislation.15 5 These two
statutes represent only minor importations from Anglo-American
states; but their enactment furnishes a p'recedent for a type of
"borrowing" which in the future well may become more fre-
quent. 5 6
Legislation which had a more significant effect on the Louisi-
ana partnership was that introducing into Louisiana law an
Anglo-American business device, the corporation. The presence
of the corporation in Louisiana at an early period greatly re-
stricted the development of Louisiana partnership law. The
courts in France, working with the eighteenth century French
codes, apparently have had no particular difficulty in adapting
French codal law to the changing requirements of commerce. In
all probability, Louisiana's law would not have followed the
French development in any event. But certainly, the availability
of the private corporation, which so amply satisfied many com-
mercial needs, rendered less probable a partnership development
in Louisiana along the French lines.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 contained a section on cor-
porations, 157 but that section contemplated municipal corpora-
tions, ecclesiastical corporations, "companies for the advance-
ment of commerce and agriculture," literary societies, colleges
and universities, and other companies the objects of which were
"the promotion of some public advantage.' ' 5 8 Undoubtedly the
redactors of the Code of 1808 did not intend to authorize the for-
mation of private corporations as they are known today; and
152. A discussion of "Assumed Name" statutes may be found in Uhlmann
v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 Pac. 435, 436-437 (1920).
153. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 2668, 2669 [Dart's Stats. (1939) Hi 6495-
6496]. See also La. Act 248 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6497-6502].
154. See Wolfe v. Joubert, 45 La. Ann. 1100, 1105, 13 So. 806, 807 (1893).
155. For cases under New York's statute, see Wood v. Erie R.R., 72 N.Y
1926, 28 Am. Rep. 125 (1878); Zimmerman v. Erhard, 83 N.Y. 74, 38 Am. Rep.
396 (1880); Gay v. Seibold, 97 N.Y. 472, 49 Am. Rep. 533 (1884).
156. Worthy of note is the fact that at least one Louisiana partnership
form is identical with a popular form used by Anglo-American lawyers. Cf.
White, A Notarial Guide and Book of Forms for the Use of Notaries, Clerks
of Court and Lawyers (5 ed.) 497-498, Form No. 137; Jones, Annotated Legal
Forms (8 ed. by Stansbury) 1809-1811.
157. Arts. 1-22, pp. 86-93.
158. Arts. 3, 5, p. 86, La. Civil Code of 1808.
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apparently no attempt was made to form private corporations
pursuant to the Code of 1808. The only Louisiana case decided
between 1808 and 1825 which involved a private corporation or
the law of private corporations was Williamson v. Smoot.15 9 As
might be expected, this first case involved the privilege of a cor-
poration formed in another state to participate in litigation before
Louisiana courts. The trial judge refused to permit a foreign cor-
poration to intervene in litigation he was hearing. On appeal,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "corporations of other
states may sue in Louisiana."
Articles relating to the private corporation were inserted
in the Civil Code of 1825.160 For a number of years after the
adoption of that code, however, few private corporations were
formed. Perhaps, at that early period, a considerable portion
of the state's legal profession, imbued with an enthusiasm to
maintain the purity of the "civil law," looked upon the corpora-
tion as a "common law" infiltration and for that reason dis-
couraged the use of the corporate contrivance. By about 1835,
however, an appreciable number of private corporations, mostly
banks and steamboat or navigation concerns, were doing'business
in Louisiana; and by 1850 a considerable number of incorporated
railroad companies and insurance companies were operating in
Louisiana.""
After 1875 the number of corporations in Louisiana increased
rapidly; the corporate device was utilized by somewhat smaller
businesses. An incorporated "gas light" company and an incor-
porated "coach" company were involved in litigation in 1883.162
Statistics are not available on the respective numbers of partner-
ships and corporations doing business in Louisiana during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century; but it is noteworthy that
the Louisiana Supreme Court during the years 1880-1885 inclu-
sive decided thirty cases involving corporation law and only
twenty-six cases involving partnership law. Thus, it seems
probable that by 1885 a large portion, if not the major portion,
of Louisiana's commercial enterprises were incorporated. No
159. 7 Mart.(O.S.) 31 (1819).
160. Arts. 418-438, La. Civil Code of 1825.
161. A Louisiana act of 1855 provided: "No corporation shall engage in
mercantile or agricultural business, nor in commission, brokerage, stock
jobbing, exchange or banking business of any kind." Yet at that time many
incorporated banks seem to have been operating. See Graham v. Hendricks,
22 La. Ann. 523, 524 (1870).
162. See The State of Louisiana v. The Herdic Coach Co., 35 La. Ann. 245
(1883); Fee v. The New Orleans Gas Light Co., 35 La. Ann. 413 (1883).
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question can exist that since 1900 the larger and more important
enterprises in Louisiana have been conducted by corporations.
The Louisiana law of partnership, due to the utilization of
the corporate device by the large commercial enterprises, did not
have an opportunity to keep pace in conceptual development with
its French parent. And as the paths of Louisiana and French
partnership law have grown farther apart, it has become more
and more probable that Louisiana lawyers and courts in the
future will never again resort to French legal materials to solve
partnership problems.
This section of the article has traced the struggle between civil
law and Anglo-American law in the field of Louisiana partnership.
In brief, the following facts were noted. Louisiana courts early
began to consider Anglo-American authorities in partnership
cases. The attempts of proponents of civil law to stem the impor-
tation of common law through the enactment of civilian' codes
failed. The broad, general codal provisions, at least those relating
to the partnership, were not adequate to regulate commercial
relations in a modern American economy. Anglo-American law
-not French law-supplied the deficiencies. Many Louisiana
lawyers could not use the French language; French legal ma-
terials were scarce; treatises and cases written in English were
more readily available. Less and less frequently did lawyers and
the courts cite French works; more and more often they resorted
to Anglo-American authorities, particularly Story, to supplement
the codal provisions. Most of the important decisions in Louisiana
between 1825 and 1900 actually were grounded on Anglo-Ameri-
can authorities. The legislature contributed to the importation
of Anglo-American law by introducing the private corporation
into Louisiana and thus carving out of the domain of the part-
nership many business relations which in France would be sub-
ject to the partnership device.
SECTION 2. REQUISITES OF THE PARTNERSHIP RELATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
Anglo-American courts for years have attempted to define
more sharply the line of demarcation between partnership and
other relations in which the efforts of individuals or legally rec-
ognized units are combined and directed toward a mutual benefit.
A surprising number of cases have been litigated even in the last
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few years1 63 to determine whether the partnership relation
existed in particular fact situations. This considerable juris-
prudence has not succeeded in isolating the minimum factual
elements necessary to create a partnership or in evolving satis-
factory tests to distinguish the partnership from other relations.
This section examines the Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence
and compares that law with Anglo-American law to determine
(1) whether Louisiana legislators and jurists have been more
successful than their Anglo-American colleagues in defining the
partnership; (2) whether Louisiana courts have developed their
own tests for determining when the partnership relation is
created or have borrowed partnership tests from Anglo-American
jurisdictions; and (3) whether the partnership concepts in Lou-
isiana law and in Anglo-American law are conterminous, whether
the factual requisites of the partnership relation are the same in
the two legal systems.
The partnership definition in the Louisiana Civil Code has
been of little assistance to the courts in ascertaining what con-
tracts or associations create the partnership relation. Like many
other definitions contained in the Louisiana Civil Code,1 6 4 the
partnership definition is imprecise and too inclusive. That defi-
nition, set forth in Article 2801, describes the partnership as
".... a synallagmatic and commutative contract made between
two or more persons for the mutual participation in the
profits which may accrue from property, credit, skill or indus-
try, furnished in determined proportions by the parties." 165
The definition undoubtedly is of French origin;16 yet it is not
substantially different from some of the earlier Anglo-American
definitions. 167 Many of the earlier Anglo-American definitions,
163. Some of the cases are collected in Notes (1942) 137 A.L.R. 6-174,
(1944) 150 A.L.R. 1003-1047.
164. Morrison, The Need for a Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code (1937)
11 Tulane L. Rev. 213, 235.
165. This definition in part resulted from an inaccurate translation. Ar-
ticle 2801 existed in the Civil Code of 1825 as Article 2772. The French text
of the latter article (which in case of conflict was to control) was inaccur-
ately translated into English; "furnished in determined proportions" should
have been "placed in common."
166. Note the similarity of the definition in French law. Art. 1832, French
Civil Code, provides: "La socifft est un contrat par, lequel deux ou plusieurs
personnes conviennent de mettre quelque chose en commun, dans la vue de
partager le bundfice qui pourra en rdsulter." Contrast the German definition.
Schuster, The Principles of German Civil Law (1907) 302; Art 705, German
Civil Code.
167. "Partnership is a contract of two or more competent persons, to
place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful
commerce or business, and to divide the profit and bear the loss, in certain
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for instance, described partnership as a contract rather than as
the relation or association 68 resulting therefrom. The Louisiana
Supreme Court as far back as 1848 commented on the similarity
of the Louisiana definition to those prevailing at that time in
French law and at common law.169
A translation of the Louisiana definition into common law
terminology discloses that it contains nothing to differentiate the
Louisiana partnership from its Anglo-American counterpart.
The word "synallagmatic" used in the definition is a civil law
term applied to a contract creative of binding obligations on all
parties to the contract. 70 Contracts are commutative if "what
is done, given or promised by one party, is considered as equiva-
lent to or a consideration for what is done, given, or promised
by the other."171 To use the most nearly descriptive common law
terminology, an agreement is both synallagmatic and commu-
tative if there is a mutuality of obligation and if the undertakings
of the parties are supported by consideration.
The Louisiana definition of partnership, like Anglo-American
definitions, does not isolate the factual components of the part-
nership or enumerate factual combinations which will create
a partnership. In Louisiana, as in most other states, the courts in
their attempts to decide whether a person is a partner must resort
to a confusing and contradictory mass of jurisprudence. No really
satisfactory statement can be found either in Louisiana or in
common law jurisdictions as to the relative weights to be attached
to certain factual elements: a person's sharing in the profits, his
undertaking to bear part of possible losses, his ownership of
assets in the business, his power to control the business, his
proportions." 3 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (14 ed. 1896) 19. For
other definitions of partnership, see 1 Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of
Partnership (4 ed. by Ewell, 1881) 2-4.
168. Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership, Including Limited
Partnership (1911) 3, § 1. The more recent definitions of partnership by
Anglo-American authorities of course refer to the partnership as an asso-
ciation or relation. U.P.A. § 6(1); Sulloway v. Rolfe, 94 N.H. 85, 47 A.(2d)
109, 110 (1946); Kamm & Schellinger Co. v. Likes, 179 N.E. 23 (Ind. App. 1931).
169. Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319, 321 (1848).
170. A synallagmatic contract is a contract "by which each of the con-
tracting parties binds himself to the other." 3 Bouvier Law Dictionary
(Rawle's Third Rev.) 3215, as quoted in State ex rel. Waterman v. J. S.
Waterman & Co., 178 La. 340, 351, 151 So. 422, 426 (1933); Sheridan v. Le
Quire, 15 So.(2d)- 118, 121 (La. App. 1943).
171. Art. 1768, La. Civil Code of 1870. A commutative contract is "one in
which each of the contracting parties gives and receives an equivalent." See
Sheridan v. Le Quire, 15 So.(2d) 118, 121 (La. App. 1943). See also Art. 1104,
French Civil Code: "II est commutatif lorsque chacune des parties &'engage d
donner, ou 4 faire une chose qui est regardde comme l'!quivalent de ce
qteon lui donne, ou de ce qu'on fait pour elle."
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actual participation in management and policy formulation. The
difficulties are multiplied by the occurrence in particular situa-
tions of these factual elements in varying degrees and combi-
nations.
In Anglo-American law, that each partner must share in
the profits is an unquestioned essential of partnership. 7 2 That
principle also is firmly intrenched in Louisiana. 173 The profit-
sharing requirement in Louisiana law is incorporated in the
Louisiana Civil Code and is admittedly French in origin.174 Yet
the scope of the requirement seems to be the same as in Anglo-
American jurisdictions. Although the parties must intend to
make profits and to share them, 1'7 5 the profits do not actually
have to be realized for a partnership to come into existence. 76
And each partner need not receive the same share of profits; the
proportion which each is to receive may be regulated by stipu-
lation in the contract. 77
172. U.P.A. § 6(1); De Long v. Whitlock, 204 Iowa 701, 215 N.W. 954, 955
(1927); Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 162 Atl. 305 (1932); Farmers' Ex-
change v. Brown, 106 Vt. 65, 169 At. 906 (1934). But see Active Market v.
Leighton, 124 Conn. 500, 200 Atl. 822, 823-824 (1938).
173. Arts. 2801, 2811, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Leonard v. Sparks,
109 La. 543, 547, 33 So. 594, 596 (1903). It is worthy of note that Art. 2811, La.
Civil Code of 1870, does not have a counterpart in the French Civil Code.
174. With reference to the necessity of profit-sharing in French law, see
23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil,
De la Socit4, du Pr~t, du Depot (3 ed. 1907) 7, no 10; 11 Hue, Commentaire
Th~orique & Pratique de Code Civil (1898) 101-104, nos 80-81; Josserard, Cours
de Droit Civil Positif Frangais (1938) 134, no 188; 1 Pic, Trait6 G6nral
Thorique et Pratique de Droit Commercial, des Soci~t6s Commerciales (2
ed. 1925) 47-58, nOs 43-52. A stipulation that one party shall receive all or
substantially all of the profits and thus leave for the other partner no ap-
preciable share in the profits is known to French law as a "clause lonine,"
in allusion to the fable of the lion who, having made a partnership agree-
ment with the other animals to go hunting, secured for himself the whole
of the prey. Art. 1855, French Civil Code, nullifies "clauses lonine" by
providing "La convention qui donnerait 4 P1un des associds la totatitd des
b5ndfices, est nulle." Art. 33, p. 394, La. Civil Code of 1808, contained an al-
most identical provision. The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
omitted the provision of the Code of 1808 which stipulated against one
partner being given all the profits; and the provision was not reincorporated
into the Code of 1870. In deleting the stipulation the redactors undoubtedly
did not intend to legalize the "clause leonine." They probably made the
deletion because they felt that Arts. 2772 and 2782 of the Civil Code of 1825
(Arts. 2801 and 2811 in the Civil Code of 1870) rendered the "clause lonine"
invalid and that further prohibition would be surplusage. Compare 11 Hue,
op. cit. supra, at 103, no 81, where the view is advanced that the first para-
graph of Art. 1855 of the French Civil Code is unnecessary. Verj likely the
redactors of the Louisiana Code of 1825 had access to some French com-
mentator taking this position.
175. Art. 2811, La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl,
loc. cit. supra note 174.
176. See Graham Paper Co. v. Lewis, 159 La. 151, 154, 105 So. 258, 259
(1925).
177. Art. 2811, La. Civil Code of 1870. In French law, the share of each
partner in the profits is equally flexible. In France stipulations in contracts
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No case has been found in Louisiana or Anglo-American
jurisprudence which indicates whether the proportion of the
profits that a person receives is significant in determining whether
he is a partner. One comparatively early Louisiana case, Magin-
his v. Crosby,178 held that a contract pursuant to which one party
was to receive only two-seventeenths of the profits created the
partnership relation; but the court did not indicate how small
a share of the profits a person might receive and still be a part-
ner. Some weight perhaps should be given the percentage of
profits a person receives in determining whether he is a partner;
but none of the tests of partnership to be discussed hereafter have
considered that factor.
A myriad of Anglo-American decisions emphasize loss-bear-
ing between the parties to a contract as an important criterion
of partnership. 1 79 In fact, courts at one time or another in per-
haps a majority of American jurisdictions, some within the last
few years, have indicated that an undertaking (express or im-
plied) by each member of a firm to share losses is a sine qua
non of partnership.18 0 Under this view a stipulation that one
partner is exempt from losses negatives the existence of a part-
nership.""1 Text writers and teachers, on the other hand, do not
attach the same significance to loss-bearing.18 2 They tend to
of partnership are considered valid which give a partner a share in the
profits up to a certain amount [Guillouard, Trait6 du contrat de Soci~t6 (2 ed.
1892) 314, no 237J; give a partner a choice between a share in the profits and
a fixed annual sum [Cass. 9 juill. 1885, S.88.1, 477]; give one partner a share
in the profits only on the happening of a certain event [23 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie et Wahl, loc. cit. supra note 174]; or deprive a managing partner of
his part of the profits if the expenditures of the partnership exceed a certain
amount [Cass. 16 nov. 1858, S.59.1, 3821.
178. 11 La. Ann. 400 (1856).
179. Stafford v. Sibley, 106 Ala. 189, 17 So. 324 (1895); L. Baldwin & Co.
v. Patrick, 39 Colo. 347, 91 Pac. 828 (1907); Sharpe v. McCreery, 20 Ky. L.
Rep. 911, 47 S.W. 1075 (1898); Van Hoose v. Smith, 355 Mo. 799, 198 S.W.(2d)
23 (1946); Criner v. Davenport-Bethel Co., 144 Okla. 74, 289 Pac. 742 (1930);
Farmers' Co-operative Elevator Co. v. Farmers' Union Co-Operative Ex-
change, 127 Okla. 275, 260 Pac. 755 (1927); Gottlieb Bros. v. Culbertson's, 152
Wash. 205, 277 Pac. 447 (1929); and cases cited in note 180, infra.
180. Illustrative: Germer v. Donaldson, 18 F.(2d) 697 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1927);
Cunningham v. Staples, 217 Ala. 531, 113 So. 590 (1927); Garber v. Whittaker,
6 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 272, 174 Atl. 34 (1934); Butz v. Hahn Paint & Varnish
Co., 220 Iowa 995, 263 N.W. 257 (1935); Harmount & Woolf Tie Co. v. Baker,
251 Ky. 795, 66 S.W.(2d) 45 (1933); National Bank of Commerce v. Francois,
296 Mo. 169, 246 S.W. 326, 332 (1922); Schneider v. Breener, 134 Misc. 449, 235
N.Y. Supp. 55 (1929); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Oles, 152 Misc.
876, 274 N.Y.Supp. 349 (1934); and cases cited in note 181, infra.
181. May v. International Loan & Trust Co., 92 Fed. 445 (C.C.A. 5th,
1899); Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank of Fort Worth v. Anderson, 216
Iowa 988, 250 N.W. 214, 218 (1933); Farmers' Co-Operative Elevator Co. v.
Farmers' Union Co-Operative Exchange, 127 Okla. 275, 260 Pac. 755 (1927).
182. Crane, Handbook of the Law of Partnership (1938) 46-51, § 14; Doug-
las, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II (1929) 38 Yale
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feel that loss-bearing is an evidentiary rather than an ultimate
fact.18 3 Many decisions, some in jurisdictions in which other
decisions have designated loss-bearing as essential, support the
position of the writers by stating that an undertaking by each
partner to bear a part of the losses is not essential to partner-
ship; 8 4 perhaps, however, some of these courts had in mind an
express undertaking. A few courts unequivocally state that an
express agreement exempting one of the parties from liability
for losses will not prevent the formation of a partnership. 8 5
An obstacle to the utilization of loss-bearing as one of the
indicia of partnership is uncertainty as to what is necessary to
constitute an agreement to bear losses. In the absence of an ex-
press stipulation by the parties, courts often imply an agreement
to share losses from the fact that they are to share profits. 86
Further, even in some of those jurisdictions which deem loss-
bearing to be essential, the courts consider a party's risk of
his services to the firm a sufficient assumption of liability for
losses. 8 7 A means of circumventing the loss-bearing requirement
is illustrated by the Georgia case of Smith v. Hancock.18 In that
case Hancock agreed to furnish Smith, the owner of a peach
orchard, money to operate the orchard; in return Smith agreed
to pay Hancock one-half of the net profits from the sale of
peaches. Losses, if they occurred, were to be borne by Smith.
The court held that the agreement created a partnership; that
Hancock, since a return on his capital was contingent on the real-
ization of profits, had "an interest in profits and losses" sufficient
to satisfy the rule requiring loss-sharing.8 9
A similar approach was taken by a New Jersey court in
Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Commission. 90 In
that case a receptionist in a beauty parlor worked under an agree-
L.J. 720, 726-727; Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920)
67-86, §§ 75-85.
183. Mechem, Cases on the Law of Partnership (5 ed. 1935) 54, n. 2. See
also Crane, op. cit. supra note 182, at 49, § 14.
184. Stafford v. First Nat. Bank, 179 Ark. 997, 13 S.W.(2d) 21 (1929). Cf.
Temm v. Temm, 354 Mo. 814, 191 S.W.(2d) 629, 631 (1946).
185. Clemens v. Crane, 234 Ill. 215, 84 N.E. 884 (1908); Simons v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P.(2d) 609 (1933); Clift v. Barrow, 108 N.Y. 187,
15 N.E. 327 (1888).
186. Fred Gray Cotton & Gin Co. v. Smith, 214 Ala. 606, 108 So. 532 (1926);
Schneider v. Schneider, 347 Mo. 102, 146 S.W. (2d) 584 (1940); Temm v. Temm,
354 Mo. 814, 191 S.W.(2d) 629 (1946); F. M. Strickland, Printing & Stationary
Co. v. Chenot, 45 S.W.(2d) 937 (Mo. App. 1932).
187. Covell v. Johnson, 196 N.W. 987 (Iowa 1924); Magnees v. Cox, 278
S.W. 1070 (Mo. App. 1926).
188. 163 Ga. 222, 136 S.E. 52 (1926).
189. 163 Ga. 222, 230, 136 S.E. 52, 56.
190. 132 N.J.L. 185, 38 A.(2d) 849 (1944).
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ment which stipulated that she was to receive a salary of $15 a
week and a "bonus" of twenty per cent of the net profits, but that
she would not be liable as between the "partners" for any debts
contracted by the "partnership." The court held that the agree-
ment created a partnership between the receptionist and the
proprietor; that the receptionist, since she was to share profits,
was "affected by" the losses of the business.
The Louisiana Civil Code,"" like the jurisprudence of many
Anglo-American jurisdictions, seems to endorse the doctrine that
loss-sharing is essential to partnership. 1 2 Article 2813 of the
code' 93 provides that a participation in the profits of a partner-
ship "carries with it a liability to contribute between the parties
to the expenses and losses"; and Article 2814 even more unequivo-
cally states that a "stipulation that one of the parties shall parti-
cipate in the profits of the partnership but shall not contribute
to the losses, is void, both as it regards the partners and third
persons." Yet the Louisiana jurisprudence has succeeded in rais-
ing a doubt whether an undertaking by all the parties to share
losses is always essential to a partnership. Further, Louisiana
courts, like Anglo-American courts, do not seem to be entirely
clear as to what constitutes an undertaking to bear losses.
In Consolidated Bank v. The State of Louisiana,9 4 decided
in 1850, the Supreme Court of Louisiana enunciated a qualifica-
tion to the rule that loss-sharing is indispensable. In that case
the State of Louisiana by legislative act had authorized the incor-
poration of the Consolidated Association of Planters of Louisiana,
the act declaring that the state was to be a stockholder in the
association to the amount of one million dollars "as a bonus."
The court assumed that a partnership had been created between
the state and the stockholders of the association but held that the
state was not liable for losses of the association. The court stated
that an exemption of one of the partners from losses is not void
if it is "based, upon a fair and just equivalent given to his asso-
ciates, by the partner in whose favor it was stipulated."' 19 ,
The decision in Consolidated Bank v. The State of Louisiana
goes far toward nullifying Articles 2813 and 2814. In most cases
in which a contract contains a stipulation exempting one of the
parties from liability for possible losses, the other parties to the
191. Arts. 2813, 2814, La. Civil Code of 1870.
192. The rule is also codified in French law. Art. 1855, French Civil Code.
193. La. Civil Code of 1870.
194. 5 La. Ann. 44 (1850).
195. 5 La. Ann. 44, 59.
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contract undoubtedly receive what to the parties involved is an
"equivalent" for the immunity granted. Perhaps the contribu-
tions of the immunized party to the enterprise are considered
of greater value than the contributions of the other parties. At
any rate, the courts in most circumstances would have difficulty
going behind the bargain of the parties to find that a "fair and
just equivalent" was not given for the exemption.
That the decision in the Consolidated Bank case is a depar-
ture from French law and that the court relied heavily on Anglo-
American authority were noted earlier in this discussion. 19 Lan-
guage in several Louisiana Supreme Court cases,197 decided sub-
sequent to the Consolidated Bank case, suggest that the supreme
court may return to a strict compliance with the codal mandate
that loss-sharing is indispensable. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeal of Louisiana, for the First Circuit, in a comparatively
recent decision, Sheridan v. Le Quire,198 cited the Consolidated
Bank case with approval and grounded its decision on that case.
In Sheridan v. Le Quire the defendant had agreed that for a
period of three years he would furnish capital for a cattle-raising
venture. The petitioner was to devote his full time and the use
of his automobile to supervising the cattle-raising on certain
premises of the defendant. Profits were to be divided equally,
"subject to a payment by petitioner to the defendant of five per
cent interest on petitioner's one-half of the profits"; and losses, if
any, were to be borne exclusively by defendant. Two months
after the parties had entered into the agreement, they quarreled.
The petitioner brought suit to recover a reasonable amount for
his services, the use of his car, and certain incidental expenses;
he alleged that he had been evicted from the property before
sufficient time had elapsed to determine whether profits would
be realized or losses incurred. The defendant filed an exception
of no cause of action, contending that the agreement created a
partnership and pointing out that in Louisiana a partner has no
cause of action for a specific sum of money until there has been a
settlement of the partnership.'99 The district court sustained the
exception. The court of appeal, in affirming the district court,
answered a contention that the stipulation against loss-sharing
196. See p. 320, supra.
197. Murrell v. Murrell and Fuller, 33 La. Ann. 1233, 1241 (1881); In re
Liquidation of Mitchell-Borne Const. Co., 145 La. 379, 387, 82 So. 377, 380-381
(1919).
198. 15 So.(2d) 118, 121-122 (La. App. 1943).
199. 15 So.(2d) 118, 120-121. In many Anglo-American jurisdictions the
general rule is that one partner cannot bring suit against another prior to
a settlement. In that regard therefore Louisiana law is not unique.
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prevented the creation of a partnership by pointing out that the
same argument had been made unsuccessfully in Consolidated
Bank v. The State of Louisiana. The court added however that
the stipulation imposing the risk of loss entirely on defendant
referred to money losses and that the petitioner risked losing the
value of his time, his skill, and the use of his automobile. 20 0
In a Louisiana Supreme Court case, In re Liquidation of
Mitchell-Borne Construction Company,201 three parties to a con-
tract were to furnish "working capital" to perform certain con-
struction. The other party, who was to receive an equal share
of the profits, was to contribute his time and experience but no
money or property. According to the testimony, he was not to
be responsible for losses. The assets devoted to the venture were
reduced by losses. In determining upon whom the losses were to
fall, the court assumed that a stipulation exempting one of the
parties from losses would have been void,20 2 but treated the
agreement as one in which three parties had agreed to risk their
money and the other party his time and experience. 20 3 The court
stated that on the dissolution' of the enterprise the parties should
be reimbursed "as nearly as possible out of the common assets, in
the proportions and forms which they contributed in the begin-
ning." Apparently the court meant that the party who contrib-
uted his services would not recover anything. The result in this
case is in accord with that reached in Anglo-American juris-
dictions.204
French authority also supports the decision in In re Liquida-
tion of Mitchell-Borne Construction Company. The second para-
graph of Article 1855 of the French Civil Code, the counterpart
of Article 2814 of the Louisiana Civil Code, has been interpreted
to permit the parties to stipulate that a partner who has contrib-
uted his services to the firm will be exempt from further contri-
bution to the losses.20 5
Anglo-American courts usually hold that the sharing of both
profits and losses by the parties to a contract is not sufficient to
create a partnership; 20 6 in other words, profit-sharing plus loss-
200. 15 So.(2d) 118, 122. As further support for its decision the court
stated that the parties "intended" to create a partnership and pointed out
that in two instances the petitioner himself had so designated the contract.
201. 145 La. 379, 82 So. 377 (1919).
202. See also Murrell v. Murrell and Fuller, 33 La. Ann. 1233, 1241 (1881).
203. 145 La. 379, 387, 83 So. 377, 380-381 (1919).
204. Magnees v. Cox, 278 S.W. 1070 (Mo. App. 1926).
205. Guillouard, Trait6 du Contrat de Soci&t6 (2 ed. 1898) 318, n ° 241.
206. Southern Ohio Pub. Service Co. v. Public Util. Comm. of Ohio, 115
Ohio St. 405, 154 N.E. 365 (1926); Commonwealth v. Southeastern Iron Corp.,
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sharing is not a conclusive test of partnership. Similarly, the
Louisiana courts in at least three cases have held that a partner-
ship did not result from an agreement by the parties to share
both profits and losses of an enterprise.2 0 7 On the other hand,
some support exists in Louisiana for the proposition that an
agreement to share both profits and losses creates a partnership
by operation of law. In. J. P. Barnett Co. v. Ludeau, 208 plaintiff
and defendant agreed "to be equal partners, sharing equally in
the profits or in the losses" in buying and selling cotton during
a certain season. The venture was to be financed and entirely
conducted by the plaintiff. The business suffered losses and
plaintiff sued to recover half of them. The defendant contended,
among other things, that the agreement was an "aleatory con-
tract," unenforceable under Louisiana law. The court held that
the contract was enforceable and strongly intimated that it
created a partnership. 20 9
An argument can be made that the Louisiana partnership,
as defined by Article 2801, differs in at least one respect from
the Anglo-American partnership. Article 2801 can be interpreted
to require each partner to contribute to the assets of the firm-
to bring into the firm something susceptible of being valued-
since that article refers to a participation in the profits which
"may accrue from property, credit, skill or industry, furnished
in determined proportions by the parties." The French authori-
ties lend support to this argument. If Louisiana had followed
French law, each partner would be required to contribute to
the original assets of the firm. In French law the contract of
partnership is said to be a contract 4 titre on6reux, that is, one
which subjects each of the parties to give or to do a certain
thing.2 10 A contract of partnership is void in France if it pur-
ports to exempt one of the prospective partners from contributing
to the partnership stock. Nullity results where a stated contribu-
142 Va. 107, 128 S.E. 528 (1925); Walker, Mosby & Calvert v. Burgess, 153 Va.
779, 151 S.E. 165 (1930).
207. Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper, 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877);
Chaff raix & Agar v. John B. Lafltte & Co., 30 La. Ann. 631 (1878); Southwestern
Gas and Electric Co. v. Liles, 133 So. 835 (La. App. 1931). ". . . they may also
agree to share profits and losses, and exclude partnership, since there is
nothing in liability for losses, an incident of the contract of partnership,
which gives it greater significance as a test of that relation than participa-
tion in profits, which is also an incident of that contract." Chaff raix & Agar
v. John B. Lafitte & Co., 30 La. Ann. 631, 639.
208. 171 La. 21, 129 So. 655 (1930).
209. 171 La. 21, 24, 129 So. 655, 655-656.
210. See 23 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Wahl, Trait6 Thdorique et Pratique
de Droit Civil, De la Societh, du Pr~t, du Depot (3 ed. 1907) 3, no 6.
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tion is "fictitious" as well as where a dispensation from contrib-
uting is incorporated into written articles of partnership. 211 In
France the contribution of the partner may be in the form of
money or other goods, or services; 212 but it must be susceptible of
pecuniary evaluation. 21 3 Considerable doubt exists under French
law whether the furnishing of "credit" is of itself a sufficient con-
tribution.214
Early Louisiana law followed its French parent in consider-
ing the contract of partnership a contract e titre ondreux. The
Civil Code of 1808 provided that each partner's bringing, or bind-
ing himself to bring, into the firm something susceptible of being
valued was of the essence of the partnership contract. 1 The
redactors of the Civil Code of 1825, perhaps influenced by Anglo-
American authorities, seem to have departed deliberately from
French law and from the early Louisiana law.216 Article 2780 of
the Code of 1825 provided:
"Property, credit, skill and industry being the sources from
which the profits of a partnership may be drawn, each of the
partners may furnish either or all of these in such proportions
as they may mutually agree." (Italics supplied.)
This article, unchanged, was later incorporated into the Civil
Code of 1870 as Article 2809. The corresponding article of the
French Civil Code is mandatory in that it requires each partner
to contribute to firm assets.21 1 J. P. Barnett Company v. Ludeau218
furnishes additional authority that a partnership may be formed
even though one partner does not contribute or bind himself to
contribute to the assets of the firm.21 9
211. Ibid.
212. 11 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique de Code Civil (1898) 31,
no 20.
213. Pic, Trait6 G~nral Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Commercial, des
Socidtds Commerciales (2 ed. 1925) 19, no 15.
214. 11 Hue, op. cit. supra note 212, at 31-32, no 21.
215. La. Civil Code of 1808, Art. 3(1), p. 388, provided: "It is of the es-
sence of said contract; 1st. That every partner should bring or bind himself
to bring into the partnership something which is susceptible of being valued,
whether it be money or any other kind of goods, or his industry."
216. The redactors of the Code of 1825 did not leave a written record of
their reasons for the change.
217. Art. 1833, French Civil Code.
218. 171 La. 21, 129 So. 655 (1930), discussed p. 346 supra.
219. But see Graham Paper Co. v. Lewis, 1 La. App. 317, 320 (1923),
where Judge Porter, speaking for the court, stated: "One of the essential
elements of partnership is the mutual contribution of capital by all the par-
ties. It is true that capital may consist of services to be performed, but in
the case just referred to, the defendant was to receive, presumably, full
compensation for his services out of the profits, and could not be said to
furnish any part of the capital."
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Anglo-American influence on the evolution of Louisiana
partnership law is made evident by tracing the various partner-
ship "tests" from their origin in Anglo-American jurisdictions
through their introduction into Louisiana law, and to their repudi-
ation in Anglo-American jurisdictions and in Louisiana. Such a
study reveals that the sundry tests and theories, after becoming
prevalent in Anglo-American jurisdictions, infiltrated into Lou-
isiana partnership law; and that each test soon after it was modi-
fied or repudiated by Anglo-American jurisdictions suffered a
similar fate in Louisiana. The following paragraphs examine in
detail the development of each test and its adoption and use by
the Louisiana courts.
The rule long prevailed in Anglo-American jurisdictions that
any participation in the profits by a person imposed liability on
him as a partner at least as to third persons. 220 The reasoning
which supported the rule was that a person who shares in the
profits of an enterprise takes from creditors part of the fund
which secures their claims. 221 Also, the courts were inclined to
apply the maxim that "he who partakes the advantage ought
to bear the loss."
Louisiana courts also at one time applied the rule that profit-
sharing alone was a conclusive test of partnership. In an early
Louisiana case, Dennistoun v. Debuys, 222 decided in 1827, the
firm of Debuys & Longer had advanced $8,000 to Dupuy "to aid
him in his business," the "interest on this money to be determined
by the profits." The court held that Debuys and Longer were
partners of Dupuy and permitted the plaintiff to recover against
them for goods sold to Dupuy. Apparently Debuys and Longer
did not participate in the conduct of the business.
In McDonald v. Millaudon22 3 plaintiff sued to recover for
merchandise delivered to the firm of W. & D. Flower, alleging
that the defendant was a dormant partner in the firm. It appeared
that defendant had contracted to advance the firm $20,000, the
firm to pay defendant ten per cent per annum interest (the maxi-
mum legal rate) and one-third of the firm's profits. Counsel for
plaintiff, relying almost entirely on Anglo-American authority,
argued that defendant's sharing in the profits rendered him liable
to the firm creditors. The court noted that in other states partici-
220. Grace v. Smith, 2 Wm. BI. 998 (1775); Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. B.
235 (1793); (1931) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 115.
221. Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. B1. 235 (1793).
222. 6 Mart.(N.S.) 48 (La. 1827).
223. 5 La. 403 (1833).
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pation in the profits imposed partnership liability, and recog-
nized that in those states the
profits of the business create a fund which all who con-
tract with the partnership have a right to look to for payment;
and that it is a fraud on those who deal with it, for any to
abstract that fund, and at the same time escape from respon-
sibility from those contracts by which the fund was created. '224
Impressed particularly by a decision of the United States Supreme
Court,225 the court held defendant liable. To reach its decision,
the court concluded, as will be recalled from a previous dis-
cussion, 226 that the Civil Code of 1808 incorporated the "law and
usages of commerce" of the other states into the Louisiana law
of commercial partnerships, unless those laws and usages con-
flicted with the positive legislation of Spain or were in opposition
to local Louisiana usages.
The rule that profit-sharing created partnership liability pre-
vailed in Anglo-American jurisdictions for almost a hundred
years, but it was criticized by text writers, followed only reluc-
tantly by the courts, and in many instances defeated by excep-
tions.2 27 The reason behind the rule was assailed. It was pointed
out that in determining profits an allowance had to be made for
debts; that creditors neither can, nor do, rely on net profits for
payment;228 that profits are surpluses left after creditors are
paid; and, further, that creditors can resort for payment of their
claims against the firm to all the assets of the firm and of the
individual partners.
The corrosive effect of criticism on the rule is manifest in
early Louisiana cases. The Louisiana courts made clear that the
rule did not apply between the parties to an alleged partnership
contract, at least not in situations where an employee's compen-
sation or a creditor's return on his investment was based on
profits.
In Bulloc v. Pailhos,229 decided in 1829, plaintiff entrusted
224. 5 La. 403, 406.
225. 5 La. 403, 409.
226. See p. 311, supra.
227. See Gilmore, Handbook on the Law of Partnership (1911) 10-18,
§§ 4-6; 1 Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership (4 ed. by Ewell,
1881) 70-71.
228. Eastman v. Clark, 53 N.H. 276, 285 (1872).
229. 8 Mart.(N.S.) 172 (La. 1829). See also Cline v. Caldwell, 4 La. 137,
139-140 (1832) (An actor does not become a partner merely because he
receives from a theater owner a part of the profits each night he puts on a
performance.).
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merchandise to defendant and sent him to Mexico to sell it. De-
fendant was to receive as his compensation half of the profits
realized from the sale of the goods. Plaintiff brought suit to
compel defendant to render an account. The court, without dis-
cussing the profit-sharing rule, held that the defendant was an
agent, not a partner, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
for the goods sold without final partnership settlement.
In St. Victor v. Daubert,2110 decided in 1836, the plaintiff and
his partner established a store and engaged defendant to manage
it at a salary of $50 a month. Defendant further was to receive
one-fourth of the profits. Plaintiff afterward purchased the in-
terest of his partner and, finding the store unprofitable, closed it.
Defendant, who was charged with the collection of debts, with-
held a considerable sum, asserting that he was privileged to
retain it until plaintiff accounted to him for his share of the
profits. In permitting the plaintiff to recover the money, the
court held that the employee's receipt of a share of the profits
as compensation did not make him a partner of his employer in
such a sense as to compel the employer to sue for a settlement
of partnership affairs.
Subsequent Louisiana cases firmly established the principle
that as between the parties "an employee, agent, factor or ser-
vant" does not become a partner merely because he shares
profits.23 1 The authorities relied on by the Louisiana courts in
these cases were predominantly Anglo-American treatises and
decisions. 23 2 The very wording of the rule used in the Louisiana
decisions tracked the language of Anglo-American authorities.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also at an early date held that
a creditor's sharing in the profits of a business in lieu of interest
on a loan or in addition to interest does not make him a partner.
230. 9 La. 314 (1836).
231. Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529 (1859); Miller v. Chandler, 29 La.
Ann. 88, 92 (1877) (dictum that employee sharing profits is not even a part-
ner as to third parties); Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper, 29 La.
Ann. 176 (1877); Collom v. Bruning, 49 La. Ann. 1257, 22 So. 744 (1897); Boutte
v. R. L. Roland & Son, 15 La. App. 530, 132 So. 398 (1931). An employee does
not become a partner even though his share of the profits is equal to that
of his employer. Collom v. Bruning, supra; Leonard v. Sparks, 109 La. 543,
33 So. 594 (1903). A contract of mandate will not be converted into a cdn-
tract of partnership, because it contains a provision that the profits shall be
divided between the parties to the act. Bluefields S.S. Co. v. Lala Ferreras
Cangelosi S.S. Co., 133 La. 424, 63 So. 96 (1913). Cf. Belden v. Read & Hunt,
27 La. Ann. 103 (1875).
232. See authorities cited in Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529 (1859);
opinion on rehearing in Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper, 29 La.
Ann. 176, 185 (1877).
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In Flower v. Millaudon,23 decided in 1834, Millaudon agreed to
furnish the firm of W. & D. Flower $20,000 for a period of three
years to pay its obligations. The members of the firm agreed to
form a new partnership with the same firm name. The new firm
was to pay Millaudon interest at ten per cent on the money
advanced and one-third of the profits realized. The court stated
that Millaudon's participation in the profits might render him
liable to third persons dealing with the firm but would not make
him a partner of the other parties to the contract or liable to
them for losses suffered by the firm.234
The Louisiana decisions in Bulloc v. Pailhos, St. Victor v.
Daubert, and Flower v. Millaudon merely adopted limitations on
the profit-sharing rule already established in Anglo-American
jurisdictions. None of those cases involved creditors or other
third parties. In fact, in St. Victor v. Daubert233 and in FlOwer v.
Millaudon,2 36 the court expressly reserved from decision the
question of whether profit-participation created liability to firm
creditors. The rule that profit-sharing created liability to credi-
tors survived a while longer in Louisiana. It was followed as
late as 1843 in Robertson v. De Lizardi.237" In that case plaintiff,
on the theory that the defendant and Mackenzie & Company were
buying cotton as partners, sought to hold defendant on two bills
of exchange drawn by Mackenzie & Company. The court, relying
almost entirely on Anglo-American authority, particularly Story
and Kent, held that the parties were partners since they had
agreed to a mutual participation in the profits of the enterprise.
In Cox v. Hickman,23 8 decided in 1860, the House of Lords,
on re-examining profit-sharing as a determinant of partnership
liability, of course disapproved the proposition that participation
in the profits of a business does of itself by operation of law create
liability to third parties for partnership losses. Language used
in the opinions in Cox v. Hickman was the basis of what came
to be known as the "mutual agency" test. Lord Cranworth, for
instance, in speaking of the liability of a partner for firm debts,
stated:
"But the real ground of the liability is, that the trade has been
233. 6 La. 697 (1834).
234. 6 La. 697, 706.
235. 9 La. 314, 317 (1836).
236. 6 La. 697, 706 (1834).
237. 4 Rob. 300 (La. 1843). "... and he who shares in the profits of a
partnership is responsible for its debts, although his name be not in the
firm." The Bank of Tennessee v. McKeage, 11 Rob. 130, 136 (La. 1845).
238. 8 H.L. Cas. 268 (1860).
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carried on by persons acting on his behalf.... It is not strictly
correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the 'trade. The correct mode of stating
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other; namely, the
fact that the trade has been carried on on his behalf, i.e., that
he stood in the relation of principal towards the persons act-
ing ostensibly as the traders .... ,,211
Perhaps Lord Cranworth meant that partners carry on the busi-
ness as co-owners; 240 that to be a partner a person must,share
in the profits as a principal, as one having a proprietary interest
in the enterprise. Many subsequent decisions, however, at least
in this country, laid down as the test of partnership existence a
determination whether the relations between the parties were
those of mutual principals and agents.241
The year before the decision of Cox v. Hickman, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court in Hallet v. Desban24 2 indicated that it was
disposed to depart from the profit-sharing test and to accept a
test based on agency principles 243 But not until 1877, in the bit-
terly contested case of Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tup-
per,244 did the Louisiana Supreme Court unequivocally reject the
profit-sharing test. In that case A, a non-resident firm, had
agreed to furnish B, a resident firm, funds to purchase a certain
amount of molasses to be selected by C, another resident firm.
B was privileged to check against A's account, but the under-
standing was that B would gain possession of the molasses before
paying for it. A was to receive one-half of profits realized on the
venture, B and C one-fourth each; losses were to be borne in the
same ratio. C purchased molasses from plaintiff and delivered it
to B, who paid C for it on delivery. Plaintiff, when C did not pay
him, brought suit against C and sequestered the molasses. A
intervened, claiming the molasses. Plaintiff sought to sustain
the sequestration on the theory that A, B, and C were partners
in the venture. The court held that A, B, and C were not partners
and dissolved the sequestration. In its opinion on rehearing,245
the court reviewed the English cases and examined the Anglo-
239. 8 H.L. Cas. 268, 306.
240. See U.P.A. § 6(1).
241. Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319, 22 Am. Rep. 387 (1876); Goubeaux
v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201 (1933).
242. 14 La. Ann. 529 (1859).
243. 14 La. Ann. 529, 531-532.
244. 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877).
245. 29 La. Ann. 176, 185.
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American treatises on partnership, including Story and Parsons,
and on the basis of those authorities repudiated the profit-sharing
test. Again the court seemed to feel that a test based on agency
principles should be substituted.24
For a number of years after Cox v. Hickman the "mutual
agency" test enjoyed popularity. By 1891, however, the test was
being subjected to withering criticism. That year the United
States Supreme Court in Meehan v. Valentine2 47 pointed out that
"agency results from partnership rather than partnership from
agency," and that the test seems to give a "synonym rather than
a definition. '248 In the same vein scholars criticized the test as
turning "the result into the cause"249 and as giving "an effect
rather than a test."250 The agency test seemed particularly un-
satisfactory in view of an apparent conflict with the partners'
privilege to make one of their number managing partner and
thus the sole agent of the firm. 2 ' In a few American jurisdic-
tions, and in comparatively recent decisions, 25 2 the courts con-
tinue to give "lip service" to the "mutual agency" test; but that
test, even from an abstract legalistic angle, is no longer a factor
in the decisions of most American courts. Louisiana courts have
shown no inclination to utilize the "mutual agency" test since
the decision in Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper.
In 1857, three years before Cox v. Hickman, a suggestion was
made in the Tennessee case of Polk v. Buchanan253 that partner-
ship contracts like other agreements should be given effect accord-
ing to the manifest intentions of the parties. And not long after
Cox v. Hickman, Sir Montague Smith in the English case of
Mollwo v. The Court of Wards2 54 declared that the existence of
the partnership relation depends on the intention of the con-
tracting parties. The "intention" test soon attained general ac-
ceptance. Under the "intention" test a court, for any of various
unexpressed reasons but of course "in accordance with the inten-
tions of the parties," can decide that a partnership either does
246. 29 La. Ann. 176, 192.
247. 145 U.S. 611, 12 S.Ct. 972 (1892).
248. 145 U.S. 611, 622, 12 S.Ct. 972, 974.
249. Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 87, § 96.
250. (1910) 10 Col. L. Rev. 174-175.
251. Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188 (1881); Kennedy v. Porter, 109 N.Y.
526, 17 N.E. 426 (1888); Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66
Pac. 1058 (1901).
252. Goubeaux v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201, 205 (1933);
Preston v. State Industrial Accident Comm., 149 P.(2d) 957, 961 (Ore. 1944).
253. 5 Sneed. (Tenn.) 721, 727-728 (1857).
254. L.R. 4 P.C. 419, 435 (1872).
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or does not exist. Further, by its nature the test is not an exclu-
sive one: courts can and do use it along with other tests.255
After the "mutual agency" test was repudiated by most
courts, the "intention" test was utilized even more frequently to
adorn judicial opinions. 256 Today it is the most widely accepted
of the partnership tests.217 The jurisprudence is replete with
multiform statements of the test: "The main test of whether or
not a partnership exists is the intention of the parties to create
a partnership";258 "The question of the existence of a partnership
between the parties thereto depends primarily upon the intention
of the parties ascertained from the terms of the agreement and
from the surrounding circumstances"; 259  "The test of partner-
ship, then, is to be found in the intent of the parties themselves,
as shown by the contract which they make."
260
The "intention" test is just as extensively used in Louisiana
as in most Anglo-American jurisdictions. The Louisiana courts
utilized Article 2805 of the Civil Code, which emphasizes the
consensual nature of the partnership relation, as a vehicle to
facilitate the introduction of the test into Louisiana.261 The Lou-
isiana Supreme Court adopted the test for the first time in 1878
in Chaffraix & Agar v. John B. Lafitte & Co.262 The case grew
out of the same factual situation which led to Chaffraix & Agar
v. Price, Hine & Tupper.26 3 The court once more elaborately re-
viewed the Anglo-American authorities, emphasizing Mofllwo
v. The Court of Wards264 and Story on Partnership;65 and again
it held that a partnership had not been created. But the court
apparently had discarded the "mutual agency" test, for it stated
that the "true, final, satisfactory, conclusive" test of whether a
partnership exists is to be found in the answer to the question:
255. People v. Hotz, 85 Cal. App. 450, 259 Pac. 506 (1927); Skinner v. Whit-
low, 184 Mo. App. 229, 167 S.W. 463 (1913).
256. Mason v. Sieglitz, 22 Colo. 320, 44 Pac. 588 (1896); Webster v. Clark,
34 Fla. 637, 16 So. 601, 604 (1894); Grinton v. Strong, 148 Ill. 587, 36 N.E.
559, 562 (1893); Mackie v. Mott, 146 Mo. 230, 47 S.W. 897 (1898).
257. Authorities listed in Note (1942) 137 A.L.R. 6, 97-98.
258. Collier v. Collier, 182 Md. 82, 88, 32 A.(2d) 469, 471-472 (1945); Beard
v. Beard, 185 Md. 178, 44 A.(2d) 469, 472 (1945).
259. Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App.(2d) 253, 160 P.(2d) 900, 901 (1945).
260. Webster v. Clark, 34 Fla. 637, f6 So. 601, 604 (1894).
261. Art. 2805, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Partnership must be created by
the consent of the parties." There is no corresponding article in the present
French Civil Code. A similar article appeared in Projet du Gouvernement
(1800) Bk. III, Tit. XIV, Art. 2, Par. 2. 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, Compiled
Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana (1942) 1533.
262. 30 La. Ann. 631 (1878).
263. 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877), discussed p. 352 et seq., supra.
264. 30 La. Ann. 631, 638.
265. 30 La. Ann. 631, 639.
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"What was the real meaning and intention of the parties, as ex-
pressed in their contract, whether verbal or written?" 2 6 Repeat-
edly in subsequent years Louisiana courts have stated that the
intentions of the parties determine whether a partnership
exists. 267
Though the courts continue to give vocal support to the
"intention" test, a firmly established line of decisions, both in
Louisiana and in Anglo-American jurisdictions, holds that a part-
nership can be created even though the parties did not foresee
or intend to create the effects which emanate from the partner-
ship relation.268  In fact, the courts often have recognized that
a partnership can be created even though the parties unquestion-
ably desire to avoid partnership liabilities and expressly declare
that their contract is not to create a partnership. 269 To reconcile
this line of cases with the "intention" test is not an easy task.
Two different approaches have been taken where the ex-
pressed intention of the parties is inconsistent with the incidents
and obligations which normally would result from their contract.
In Pennsylvania, the expressed intentions of the parties appar-
ently prevail, regardless of variance between the incidents they
indicate are to flow from the contract and the typical and charac-
teristic incidents of the contract actually made.2 7 0 The "inten-
tion" test in this jurisdiction is carried to its logical conclusion.
Where the parties expressly declare that they do not intend to
create a partnership, further inquiry is unnecessary; they are not
266. Ibid.
267. Leonard v. Sparks, 109 La. 543, 548, 33 So. 594, 596 (1903); Daspit v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 199 La. 441, 454-455, 6 So.(2d) 341, 345 (1942); Glover v.
Mayer, 209 La. 599, 606-607, 25 So.(2d) 242, 244 (1946) and authorities there
cited; Williams v. Ralph R. Miller Shows, 15 So.(2d) 249, 253 (La. App.
1943).
268. Cooley v. Broad, 29 La. Ann. 345, 29 Am. Rep. 332 (1877); Cameron
v. Orleans and Jefferson Ry., 108 La. 83, 99, 32 So. 208, 214 (1901); authorities
cited note 269 infra. "When two or more persons make an agreement which
the law defines as a partnership, it is a partnership, and the liability of the
partners for the partnership debts is determined by the law relating to part-
nership, even though the parties may not have thought of such consequence."
Graham Paper Co. v. Lewis, 159 La. 151, 105 So. 258, 259 (1925).
269. Cooley v. Broad, 29 La. Ann. 345, 29 Am. Rep. 332 (1877); Cameron
v. Orleans and Jefferson Ry., 108 La. 83, 32 So. 208 (1901); Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Hibou, 92 Miss. 234, 46 So. 73 (1908). "True, intent must be gathered
from the acts of the parties, and not from an unlawful desire to avoid
liability; that is to say, the parties may intend to avoid liability, and may
fail to do so because their acts and their contract establish a status from
which liability as a partner follows." In re Hoyne, 277 Fed. 668, 674 (1922).
270. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 222 Pa. 58, 70 Atl. 956, 959 (1908). Cf. Canton
Bridge Co. v. City of Eaton Rapids, 107 Mich. 613, 65 N.W. 761 (1895) (The
express intention prevails unless "so at variance and so inconsistent with
their engagement as to be irreconcilable.").
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partners, at least among themselves, even though their agree-
ment has all the characteristics of a contract of partnership.271
On one occasion the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to have
taken the same position. In Halliday v. Bridewel1272 the court
said: 273
"It would be perfectly competent for parties to form a con-
tract with each other, which, ordinarily, would constitute a
partnership and produce all the effects of partnership, and yet
to stipulate with each other that it should not produce such
effects; and such stipulation, as between themselves, would
be valid."
And perhaps the Pennsylvania court and the Louisiana court in
Halliday v. Bridewell were right. Why should not the parties, as
among themselves, be allowed great contractual freedom in modi-
fying the rules which ordinarily apply to the partnership con-
tract?
The text writers and many courts, however, purport to har-
monize the "intention" test with decisions holding that a partner-
ship can be created contrary to the expressed intentions of the
parties. They emphasize the legal intention, the intention implied
in law, as distinguished from the expressed or declared inten-
tion.2 14 The parties to a contract, in spite of their expressions to
the contrary, are said to intend in law to create the relation which
the contract expresses; 275 they are presumed, so to speak, to in-
tend the legal consequences of their acts. 276 Many Louisiana
cases, seemingly in conflict with the' language of Halliday v.
Bridewell, but certainly in accord with most Anglo-American
authorities, hold that the partnership relation follows, regard-
less of the expressed intention of the parties, if the acts of the
parties satisfy all of the legal conditions necessary to create a
partnership.277 That the Louisiana courts use the same technique
as other American courts is amply shown by the language of the
court in Amacker v. Kent:278
271. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 222 Pa. 58, 70 Atl. 956, 959 (1908).
272. 36 La. Ann. 238 (1884).
273. 36 La. Ann. 238, 240.
274. Note (1942) 137 A.L.R. 6, 103-109, and authorities there listed;Mechem, Elements of the Law of Partnership (2 ed. 1920) 64, § 72.
275. Southern Can Co. of Baltimore City v. Hartlove, 152 Md. 303, 136
Al. 624, 627 (1927).
276. Mechem, loc. cit. supra note 274.
277. Cooley v. Broad, 29 La. Ann. 345, 347 (1877); Cameron v. Orleans andJefferson Ry., 108 La. 83, 99, 32 So. 208, 214 (1901); Graham Paper Co. v.
Lewis, 159 La. 151, 154, 105 So. 258, 259 (1925).
278. 144 La. 545, 553, 80 So. 717, 720 (1919).
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"Where the question of partnership vel non is to be deter-
mined, between the parties to the contract, the main inquiry
is to be directed to the ascertainment of their real intention.
If it be found that they have agreed upon all those matters
which, in law, constitute a contract of partnership, it must
be presumed that they intended that contract. If, on the other
hand, some essential element of that contract is omitted, it is
not a contract of partnership, no matter what it may be
called." (Italics supplied.)
The use of the "intention" test by a court, as has been indi-
cated previously,2 9 does not preclude a resort to other tests.
Anglo-American courts frequently utilize other tests, sometimes
a number of them, to determine, as they say, the "real" intentions
of the parties; 2 0 and, as might be expected, Louisiana courts
sometimes use that method to arrive at the intentions of the
parties. 281
The "intention" test, as applied both in Louisiana and in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, is valueless.28 2 The meaning of
a court is far from clear when it states that "the parties must
intend to create a partnership." Sometimes the court means no
more than that partnership is a consensual relation, that a person
cannot be forced against his will to enter into such a relation.
Undoubtedly, however, a court usually means something more,
though exactly what is dubious. Courts invariably neglect to
specify what the parties must intend. They do not enumerate
the operative facts essential to a partnership or state exactly what
relationships the parties must intend to assume in order to be-
come partners. The courts themselves cannot agree on the factual
elements characteristic of the partnership relation; yet they pur-
port to base their decisions on a test which assumes that the con-
tracting parties know what a partnership is. That the "inten-
tion" test is unsatisfactory is further demonstrated by the fact
that courts using it either in Louisiana or in Anglo-American
jurisdictions usually have to proceed to other criteria to ascer-
tain the "real" intentions of the parties. 28
3
279. P. 353, supra.
280. Munro v. Whitman, 8 Hun 553 (N.Y. 1876); People v. Hotz, 85 Cal.
App. 450, 259 Pac. 506 (1927); Skinner v. Whitlow, 184 Mo. App. 229, 167
S.W. 463 (1913).
281. Cameron v. Orleans & Jefferson Ry., 108 La. 83, 99, 32 So. 208, 214
(1902).
282. For a rather early, though superficial criticism of the "intention"
test, see 1 Rowley, The Modern Law of Partnership (1916) 45, § 47.
283. See Amacker v. Kent, 144 La. 545, 80 So. 717 (1919); Daspit v. Sin-
clair Refining Co., 199 La. 441, 6 So.(2d) 341 (1942).
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Courts often use certain vague, epithetical phrases as if they
were partnership criteria, or at least descriptive of partnership
attributes. For instance, one court states that a fundamental test
of the existence of a partnership is "community of interest be-
tween parties in the business"; 28 4 another that partnership in-
volves "community of interests in the common enterprise"; 28 5 a
third that a partnership "connotes a community of interest. '28 6
Other courts make similar remarks.28 7 Language of this nature
first appeared in partnership literature when jurists and legal
scholars were attempting by subtle distinctions to circumvent the
profit-sharing rule of Waugh v. Carver. The same phrases passed
from one opinion to another and now abound in the jurisprudence
though the rule which engendered them long since has ceased to
exist.
These ambiguous statements are verbal legerdemain; they
delude and befuddle rather than clarify. They certainly fail to
isolate the factual essentials of a partnership. In fact, these
phrases are as hazy as the word "partnership" itself. In an at-
tempt to give them more definite meanings, courts often try to
define "community of interest." Unfortunately the definitions do
not harmonize. Some courts say that the
"... community of interest between the parties must be of
such a nature that it makes each member a coprincipal and
an agent of all the members in the business with joint author-
ity or right in administration, control, or disposal of the busi-
ness or its property.
'288
These courts are really letting the old "mutual agency" test slip
in through the back door. Other courts qualify "community of
interest" to " community of interest in the property, 28 9 "com-
munity of interest in the capital stock," 290 "community of interest
284. Temm v. Temm, 354 Mo. 814, 191 S.W.(2d) 629, 631 (1945).
285. Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.(2d) 789, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). See also
Southern Surety Co. v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 2 S.W.(2d) 310, 312 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) (The "test of the existence of the partnership relation is a
common enterprise and a community of interest therein.").
286. United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 154 F.(2d) 745, 747 (C.C.A. 10th,
1946).
287. See (1910) 10 Col. L. Rev. 174.
288. First Nat. Bank of Eugene v. Williams, 142 Ore. 648, 660, 20 .P.(2d,
222, 226 (1933); Preston v. State Industrial Accident Comm., 174 Ore. 553, 149
P.(2d) 957, 961 (1944). For similar language, see Prasse v. Prasse, 77 S.W.
(2d) 1001, 1005 (Mo. 1934).
289. Guthrie v. Foster, 256 Ky. 753, 76 S.W. (2d) 927, 929 (1934).
290. Webster v. Clark, 34 Fla. 637, 16 So. 601, 604 (1894). Cf. Farmers' &
Merchants' Nat. Bank of Fort Worth v. Anderson, 216 Iowa 988, 250 N.W.
214, 217-218 (1933).
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in the profits," 291 or "community of interest in the profits and
losses. '292 Another group of courts utilize several of these phrases
as partnership tests; quite frequently the primary tests of part-
nership are listed as293 (1) a community of interest in profits
and losses, (2) a community of interest in the capital employed,
and (3) a community of power in administration.
Because of the great variety of connotations which attach to
"community of interest," the use of that term without further
elaboration does not promote clarity of thought. And, even if the
phrase is defined or explained, it probably does not convey any
idea which could not be communicated more accurately by other
language.
The Louisiana courts also use much vague and unserviceable
language. The Louisiana Supreme Court, for instance, quoting
Anglo-American authority, approved the statement that "a com-
munity of profits is the criterion by which to determine a contract
of partnership." 294 Apparently the court felt that a "community
of profits" existed if the parties sharing profits were entitled to
accountings. 205 But each partner is entitled to an accounting!
Thus to assert that a community of profits is the criterion of part-
nership is to say little more than that partnership is the criterion
of partnership. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated also
on several occasions that "a community of goods and a proprie-
tary interest therein" is essential to partnership.296 The court
could not have meant that the partners had to be co-owners of
property used in the partnership business; often property used
in the firm business is owned by only one partner and its use only
devoted to partnership purposes.
Since World War I the influence of "control" as a determi-
nant of partnership gradually has increased. 297 Prior to World
291. Guthrie v. Foster, 256 Ky. 753, 76 S.W. (2d) 927, 929 (1934); Webster
v. Clark, 34 Fla. 637, 16 So. 601, 604 (1894); Kamm & Schellinger Co. v. Likes,
93 Ind. App. 598, 179 N.E. 23, 25 (1931).
292. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286, 66S.Ct. 532, 535 (1946). See also Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 618, 12 S.Ct.
972, 973 (1892).
293. Malvern Nat. Bank v. Halliday, 195 Iowa 734, 192 N.W. 843, 846(1923); Citizens' Bank of Milo v. C. F. Scott & Son, 217 Iowa 584, 250 N.W.
626, 628 (1933). Cf. United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 154 F.(2d) 745, 747
(C.C.A. 10th, 1946).
294. Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529, 531 (1859); Chaffraix & Agar v.
Price, Hine & Tupper, 29 La. Ann. 176, 192 (1877).
295. Hallet v. Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529, 532 (1859).
296. Belden v. Read & Hunt, 27 La. Ann. 103, 104 (1875); Shushan Bros.
& Co. v. Drennan & Hillcoat, 158 La. 480, 488, 104 So. 214, 216 (1925).
297. Rowley, The Influence of Control in the Determination of Partner-
ship Liability (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 290.
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War I lawyers did not consider control of significance in deter-
mining when a person acquired the status of a partner or became
subject to partnership liability. And many, probably most, courts
still base the partnership relation on abstract legalistic doctrines
without establishing whether the persons burdened with the
duties and liabilities of that relation have a voice in the control
of the enterprise. Yet, an ever increasing number of courts, per-
haps feeling that the business losses should fall on entrepreneurs
and that control is an incident to proprietorship, regard the pres-
ence or absence of control (at least in certain types of cases) as a
determining factor in the imposition of partnership liability.298
The "control" test originated in cases distinguishing the part-
nership from the business trust and probably still is used most
extensively in cases of that character; but some courts now utilize
that test to distinguish partnership contracts from other contracts
which contemplate profit-sharing.299
In 1929 William 0. Douglas, 300 suggested an approach for the
imposition of partnership liability30 1 based on variations in the
allocation of control; this approach apparently received the ap-
probation of legal scholars. A number of paragraphs, though per-
haps they stray from the central theme of this paper, are devoted
to a discussion of Douglas' ideas and an inquiry as to whether
those ideas have affected the thinking of the courts.
Douglas suggested that the entrepreneur theory of liability
-a theory developed originally in the field of agency-be modi-
fied and applied to partnership cases. Under the entrepreneur
298. Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Williams v. In-
habitants of Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N.E. 355 (1913); Frost v. Thompson, 219
Mass. 360, 106 N.E. 1009 (1914). Control now plays a large part in determining
when a partnership exists for taxation purposes. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946). Yet the United States
Supreme Court made it clear that a person might be considered a partner
for tax purposes even though he did not have a right to control. The court
said: "If she either invests capital originating with her or substantially con-
tributes to the control and management of the business, or otherwise per-
forms vital additional services, or does all of these things she may be a part-
ner as contemplated by Internal Revenue Code." 327 U.S. 280, 290, 66 S.Ct.
532, 537.1 299: United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 154 F.(2d) 745 (C.C.A. 10th,
1946); Southern Can Co. v. Hartlove, 152 Md. 303, 136 Atl. 624 (1927); H. H.
Worden Co. v. Beals, 120 Ore. 66, 250 Pac. 375, 378 (1926); H. T. Hackney
Co. v. Robert E. Lee Hotel, 156 Tenn. 243, 300 S.W. 1 (1927); Sheldon v.
Little, 111 Vt. 301, 15 A.(2d) 574 (1940); Thomas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxa-
tion, 250 Wis. 8, 26 N.W.(2d) 310 (1947); San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v.
Costaloupes, 96 Cal. App. 322, 274 Pac. 84 (1929).
300. Then Professor of Law at Yale Law School; now Associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court.
301. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II (1929)
38 Yale L. J. 720, 720-739.
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theory, to determine whether persons who have associated them-
selves together are in fact co-enterprisers, the following "ear-
mark facts" are important: (1) control, that is, the ability to for-
mulate and execute policies; (2) ownership of the property used
in carrying on the enterprise; (3) profit-sharing; (4) loss-sharing.
The presence of at least three of these earmarks, in addition to
an agreement to associate, is necessary to constitute the parties
co-enterprisers. Douglas felt that the entrepreneur theory ade-
quately squared the decisions as to what factual variations will
create a partnership, but he advocated certain refinements of
the theory.30 2
Douglas' ideas in brief were: the capacity of individuals to
absorb losses allocated to them is the premise from which the
entrepreneur theory proceeds; such capacity is measured by the
ability to distribute the cost items of the business among cus-
tomers who enjoy the services of the business and who therefore
should pay for them; those persons having ability to manipulate
the profit differential, that is, the differential between cost and
selling price, are in the best position to act as effective risk dis-
tributors. Douglas further reasoned that all types of control are
not significant in risk distribution, that the only types of control
relevant to risk distribution are the rights to fix prices and the
rights to determine the various cost items; but that those two
rights or, to be precise, the rights to fix substantially the price
and to determine substantially the cost items, are each a sine qua
non to effective risk distribution; and that partnership liability
should be imposed only on those persons who, can exercise both
those types of control. As to profit-sharing Douglas said: 30 3
"Profit sharing would not be essential. That is not to say that
sharing profits as such would never be a sine qua non. If the
right to determine costs did not include the right to make the
liability in question a cost item, and to get reimbursement
from the assets, profit sharing in the strict sense would be a
sine qua non. For it would provide the channel for reimburse-
ment."
To sum up, Justice Douglas felt that loss-sharing, ownership of
the property used in the business, and many types of control are
not relevant in determining whether partnership liability should
be imposed. Even profit-sharing is not essential. The only essen-
302. Id. at 723-724.
303. Id. at 735.
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tials are the rights substantially to determine cost items and
substantially to fix prices.
Douglas' ideas have not had any noticeable effect on the
thinking of courts either in Louisiana or in other states. During
the two decades which have elapsed since Douglas advanced his
theories, apparently not a single decision involving the imposition
of partnership liability has been influenced by them. And if doc-
trine be disregarded and attention directed solely to the facts of
the cases, still many decisions since 1929 cannot be explained by
Douglas' theories.30 4
Most courts, as has been mentioned, '0 5 still base partnership
liability on abstract legalistic doctrines and do not consider the
distribution of control at all.30 6 Two Louisiana decisions0 T are
among the many recent cases which have failed to give conside-
ration to the allocation of control in imposing partnership lia-
bility. The courts in these two Louisiana cases based their de-
cisions on the "intention" test.30 8 Ironically enough, the Louisiana
courts were seeking guidance in an unserviceable Anglo-Ameri-
can doctrine when by resorting to the French authorities they
could have aligned themselves with the more progressive of the
American jurisdictions. The French commentators emphasize
the importance of a right to control the business. They point out
that a person, to be a partner, must participate on a certain foot-
ing of equality, that he must have that right of ultimate control
and that right to criticize which are characteristic of the entre-
preneur.3 09
Some of the courts which in their opinions rely on legalistic
doctrines perhaps are influenced subconsciously by the allocation
of control, but 'the facts recorded in the opinions do not state
expressly in whom control was vested. It may be that in many
of these cases a reasonable implication exists as to where the
304. Corbin v. Collum, 173 Ga. 681, 160 S.E. 771 (1931); Davidson v. Shaffer,
153 Kan. 661, 113 P.(2d) 90 (1941); Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation
Comm., 132 N.J.L. 185, 38 A.(2d) 849 (1944); Associated Piping & Engineering
Co. v. Jones, 61 P.(2d) 536 (Cal. App. 1936). Cf. Myers v. St. Louis Structural
Steel Co., 333 Mo. 464, 65 S.W.(2d) 931 (1933).
305. P. 356 et seq., supra.
306. See authorities cited supra note 304.
307. Glover v. Mayer, 209 La. 599, 25 So.(2d) 242 (1946); Sheridan v. Le
Quire, 15 So.(2d) 118 (La. App. 1943).
308. 209 La. 599, 605-607, 25 So.(2d) 242, 244; 15 So.(2d) 118, 122.
309. Pic, Trait6 G6n~ral Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Commercial, des
Socift~s Commerciales (2 ed. 1925) 81-82, n ° 76; 23 Baudry-Lancantinerie et
Wahl, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, De la Socift6, du Pr~t,
du D~pot (3 ed. 1907) 23-29, nOs 21 bis.-31; Guillouard, Trait6 du Contrat de
Socikt6 (2 ed. 1892) 18-29, no s 14-19.
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right to control rested, and that many decisions can be recon-
ciled with the control test by reading between the lines of the
facts actually stated to discover whether control was present or
absent. Yet, if the decisions really do hinge on control, it seems
desirable that the courts specify what control the alleged partner
has and whether or not they feel that such control is sufficient
to justify the imposition of partnership liability.
Douglas, it will be recalled,3 10 dissected control. He stated
that the right to control, other than the right to control price and
cost items, is irrelevant;3 11 thus he indicated that he meant by
"right to control the cost items" something considerably less than
the right to control the enterprise as a whole. He must have
meant, at most, the right to determine if, when, and perhaps
where and from whom, raw materials, labor and capital would
be procured, and the respective quantities in which those items
would be obtained and the prices which would be paid for them.
Even the cases which emphasize control do not dissect it
and discard as extraneous to partnership liability all control
except control of the price and control of the cost items.312 This
failure to follow Douglas appears justified. From a realistic
point of view, control of the cost items can be said to comprehend
complete control of the business since the management of any
aspect of the business may influence the cost of the product; yet,
as has been seen, Douglas did not use the phrase in that broad
sense.
A major function of the entrepreneur is to attain efficiency
in the operating processes of the business. He is responsible for
the installation and enforcement of system and order so that
work will flow through the plant without waste of materials,
time, or effort. Clearly the operating efficiency of a business in
part determines the profit differential. If the entrepreneur is to
distribute risks, the income from the sale of the services of the
business must exceed cost items other than those risks. The
availability of funds to defray the cost of insuring against risks
depends on efficient operation.
310. P. 360, supra.
311. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 301, at 727.
312. "Ownership involves control. It is impossible to state that this or
that power makes the man who possesses it an owner or co-owner of a busi-
ness." Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158, 167-
168. Probably the most notable of the cases which do dissect control to any
extent are Southern Can Co. v. Hartlove, 152 Md. 303, 136 Atl. 624 (1927);
San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v. Costaloupes, 90 Cal. App. 322, 274 Pac.
84 (1929).
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Efficiency is a complex management process which involves
the balancing of various factors, including cost items,, method,
timing, quality, quantity, and the condition of the market. The
right to formulate policies with respect to: the assembly of men,
materials, money and machinery; the organizational pattern, that
is, the segregation and grouping of the many activities involved
in a business operation; the scheduling of production; and the
marketing of the products-all are important. The courts prop-
erly have refused to accept Douglas' theory that the right to con-
trol' cost items and the right to control the selling price are the
only types of control relevant to the manipulation of the profit
differential.
Possession of the power to distribute risk does seem a proper
basis for determining upon whom partnership liability should be
imposed. And those persons who have the right to control the
business, to formulate its policies, are the ones who are able to
distribute the risk and perhaps by careful management to reduce
the risk. A proper method, it is submitted, for a court to follow
in determining whether to impose partnership liability on a
person would be to examine all elements of control he is privi-
leged to exercise, and to ascertain as a matter of fact whether
he is in a position effectively to distribute risk.
Since both Louisiana and Anglo-American courts could uti-
lize the "control" test profitably, why do so many ignore control
and base their decisions on abstract legalistic doctrines?' Perhaps
the answer is to be found in the difficulty which usually exists
in determining who actually has the right to control. Often agree-
ments do not stipulate who is to have the policy-making powers.
To determine who has the right to control, the courts frequently
would have to resort to vague understandings arising out of the
parties' past dealings or founded on the personalities3 13 and
socio-economic status of the parties.
The problem is complicated by the numerous variations, both
in kind and extent, to which rights to participate in management
are subject. Further, most rights to participate in the control of
a business, considered separately, are consistent both with the
partnership relation and with relations resulting from other
contracts such as the contract of loan and the contract of employ-
ment. A right to direct employees, for instance, does not in Lou-
313. In Gaspar v. Buchingham, 116 Mont. 236, 153 P.(2d) 892 (1944), the
court held two brothers to be partners in a livestock business though the
older brother definitely was the stronger personality and plainly was the
leader who exercised ultimate control over the business.
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isiana or elsewhere distinguish a partner from a supervisory
employee.314 A Louisiana case, Cavill v. Harries,315 is illustrative.
The plaintiff claimed to be a partner in a painting and wall-
papering business operated by defendant. The latter asserted
that plaintiff was merely clerk and bookkeeper. One of the plain-
tiff's witnesses, who had worked in the business as an "outside"
man, testified that plaintiff had directed him as to the jobs on
which to work. The court considered this testimony of little
value, feeling that it was consistent equally with the existence
of a partnership or an employment. 316
Anglo-American courts and Louisiana courts alike are reluc-
tant to impose partnership liability on a person merely because,
in addition to sharing in the profits, he participates in the control
of the enterprise, particularly if he has loaned money to the busi-
ness and purports to exercise control to protect his investment.
Still, a person can secure all the advantages of a partner, includ-
.ing a partner's authority, but escape partnership liability by mas-
querading as a creditor of the business.
Martin v. Peyton31 7 is an illustration of the extensive control
which some Anglo-American courts permit a profit-sharing credi-
tor to assume without imposing on him partnership liability. In
that case the firm of K. N. & K., finding itself in financial diffi-
culty, borrowed $2,500,000 worth of liquid securities. The lend-
ers in return for the loan were to receive forty per cent of the
firm's profits. To protect the lenders against loss, K. N. & K.
turned over to them a large number of securities, speculative in
nature, which could not be used as collateral for bank loans.
Trustees, representing the lenders, were to be kept informed of
all transactions affecting the securities loaned to K. N. & K.; and
the trustees Were vested with certain powers to make substitu-
tions among the latter securities. The management of the firm
was conferred on Hall, a member of the firm and an intimate
acquaintance of the lenders. Each member of the firm was to
place his resignation in the hands of Hall. If at any time Hall
and the trustees agreed that a resignation should be accepted,
that member would retire from the firm. The trustees were to
be kept advised as to the conduct of the business and consulted
on important matters. They were privileged to inspect the firm
314. See Hill Cattle Corp. v. Killorn, 79 Mont. 327, 256 Pac. 497 (1927).
315. 170 La. 85, 127 So. 373 (1930).
316. 170 La. 85, 87, 127 So. 373, 374.
317. 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927). See also Myers v. St, Louis Struc-
tural Steel Co., 33 Mo. 464, 65 S.W.(2d) 931 (1933).
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books and were empowered to veto any business they considered
speculative or injurious. As further security each member of the
firm assigned to the trustees his interest in the firm. Finally, the
lenders were granted an option to enter the firm at a later date
by buying fifty per cent or less of the interests of all or any of
the members at a stated price. The plaintiffs claimed that the
lenders became partners in the firm.
The court refused to impose partnership liability, holding
that the control vested in the lenders was insufficient to create
partnership. The court felt that the stipulations for control were
properly inserted to protect the lenders. Yet through their
trustees they had extensive control over the business, and to
consider Hall the agent of the lenders in his conduct of the
business would not be unrealistic. The lenders enjoyed the
advantages of partners but assumed no risks. The "option" to
buy into the business clearly was not necessary to protect the
investment. Its only function was to permit the lenders to avoid
partnership liability and yet be able to participate for an indefi-
nite time in firm profits if the firm should weather its difficulties
and thereafter prosper.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Greend v. Kumme1318 mani-
fested similar reluctance to impose a partner-status on a creditor.
In that case the creditor "assumed control and general superin-
tendence of the business and establishment, and performed many
acts of apparent ownership. '319 Nevertheless, the court held that
the creditor had not become a partner. It termed the control
exercised by the creditor "acts of administration" and stated that
he was permitted to assume "the superintendence and principal
management of the business" because the owners had confidence
in his ability.3 20
Courts utilizing a "control" test must distinguish situations
in which a person sharing profits does not have sufficient con-
trol to be a partner from situations in which a partner has dele-
gated his right to control. The proposition is as well established
in Louisiana3 21 as elsewhere322 that the partners may designate
one of their number as managing partner with exclusive author-
ity to conduct the business. This type of delegation of authority
318. 41 La. Ann. 65, 5 So. 555 (1889). See, however, Brandin Slate Co. v.
Bennett, 193 La. 89, 190 So. 342 (1939).
319. 41 La. Ann. 65, 70, 5 So. 555, 558.
320. Ibid.
321. Arts. 2867, 2875, La. Civil Code of 1870.
322. Kennedy v. Porter, 109 N.Y. 526, 17 N.E. 426 (1888); Thompson v.
0. W. Childs Estate Co., 90 Cal. App. 552, 266 Pac. 293 (1928).
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at least does not preclude partnershipY2 3 Those who have ulti-
mate control but delegate to an agent their right to control should
be held to be partners. 32 4 Yet the line between a partner who has
delegated his right to manage and a person who shares profits
but does not have a right of control often is a thin one.
Both Louisiana and Anglo-American courts use the various
partnership tests for a dual purpose: (1) to ascertain whether
the partnership relation has been created inter se, and (2) to
determine whether partnership liability should be imposed with
respect to third persons. Since their repudiation of the profit-
sharing rule of Waugh v. Carver, Anglo-American courts gen-
erally have held that persons who are not partners as to each
other are not partners as to third persons. 325 Yet they recognize
one important exception to that rule. Where a person has repre-
sented himself as a partner, they consider him a "partner by
estoppel" and impose liability to third persons as if he were a
partner.32' The rule is equally well established in Louisiana that
"holding oneself out" as a partner will result in partnership lia-
bility to third persons.3 27 No significant differences are apparent
between the Louisiana and Anglo-American notions of partner-
ship by estoppel or "holding out." In both systems the manifes-
tations constituting the holding out must be those of the person
upon whom liability is sought to be imposed, or must have been
made with his consent.3 28 Other than in partnership by "holding
out," neither the Louisiana nor the Anglo-American courts make
a distinction between the tests used in cases where the existence
of a partnership between the parties is in issue and cases in which
third persons seek to impose partnership liability on parties to
an alleged partnership relation.
Yet, the fact that the same tests are applied both when the
issue involves the relations of the parties inter se and when it
involves liability to third persons is one of the prime causes of
323. Hardymon v. Glenn, 56 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Ky. 1944); Associated
Piping & Engineering Co. v. Jones, 61 P.(2d) 536 (Cal. App. 1936).
324. Similarly, profit-sharers who have a right to control but fail to exer-
cise it should not escape partner-status.
325. U.P.A. § 7(1).
326. U.P.A. § 16; De Long v. Whitlock, 204 Iowa 701, 215 N.W. 954 (1927).
327. Grieff & Byrnes v. Boudousquie & Fortier, 18 La. Ann. 631 (1866);
Perez v. The New Orleans, City & Lake R.R., 47 La. Ann. 1391, 17 So. 869
(1895); Houston River Canal Co. v. Kopke, 106 La. 609, 31 So. 156 (1901);
Johnson v. Marx Levy & Bro., 109 La. 1036, 1044-1045, 34 So. 68 (1902);
Triangle Machine Co. v. Dutton & Adams, 13 La. App. 14, 127 So. 54 (1930).
328. U.P.A. § 16; Borden-Aicklen Auto Supply Co. v. Folse Service Station,
6 La. App. 1 (1927); Triangle Machine Co. v. Dutton & Adams, 13 La. App.
14, 127 So. 54 (1930).
1949]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the unsatisfactory tests of partnership. Entirely different con-
siderations should govern the two types of cases. As between the
parties themselves no reason exists why they should not be per-
mitted complete contractual freedom to vary the relations which
usually are attributed to the partnership. For instance, if parties
enter into a contract pursuant to which a business is to be con-
ducted and the contract contains some stipulations which ordi-
narily are associated with a partnership and other stipulations
which customarily are inserted in a contract of employment, all
of the stipulations should, if possible, be given effect. Perhaps
a court in a suit between the parties, rather than trying to deter-
mine whether for all purposes a partnership exists, should
attempt to ascertain what relations the parties intended to create
with respect to the specific question at issue. In contests solely
between the parties to a contract the allocation of control should
not be particularly significant in ascertaining other relations,
especially when the parties have undertaken to stipulate in re-
gard to those other relations. On the other hand, when the ques-
tion before the court is whether the parties to the contract or
one of them is liable to third persons, an entirely different ap-
proach should be taken. Assuming that it is socially desirable
for each business to pay its own way, liability for the obliga-
tions of the business should be imposed on those who are in the
best position-whether the courts choose to call them partners
or not-to apportion the costs of conducting the business among
the customers. The persons best able to apportion the costs are
of course those with control. Therefore, control should be highly
important in determining which persons are to be responsible to
third parties for the obligations of the business.
This section has established that the Louisiana definition of
partnership contains no stipulation that differentiates the Louisi-
ana partnership from the Anglo-American partnership; that Lou-
isiana courts have utilized the same partnership tests known to
Anglo-American courts; that, with the possible exception of the
:.control" test, every Anglo-American partnership test infiltrated
into Louisiana law and at one time or another was used by the
Louisiana courts; that the same unserviceable, epithetical phrases
are to be found both in Louisiana and in Anglo-American juris-
prudence relating to partnership existence and partnership lia-
bility; that the fact that Louisiana courts have not availed them-
selves of the control test does not differentiate Louisiana part-
nership law from that of most Anglo-American jurisdictions be-
cause, like the Louisiana courts, the courts in a great majority
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of the other jurisdictions still base partnership existence on
abstract legalistic doctrines and give little or no consideration
to the allocation of control; that not a single court, in Louisiana
or elsewhere, has been influenced noticeably by the theories of
William 0. Douglas; that the concept of partnership by estoppel
or "holding out" is known to Louisiana as well as to Anglo-
American law; and, finally, that the various partnership tests
have functioned so unsatisfactorily in both Louisiana and Anglo-
American law that the whole problem of partnership status and
partnership liability should be re-examined.
(To be concluded)
